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NOTE
INTERSTATE SCOPE OF THE UNIFORM SECURITIES
ACT-A CASE ANALYSIS
State securities laws, now in force in every state,1 generally impose
1. ALA. CODE tit. 53, §§ 28-65 (Cum. Supp. 1973); ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.55.010-
.270 (1962, Supp. 1973); Auitz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1801 to -2066.10 (1967, Supp.
1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1235 to -1263 (1966, Supp. 1973); CAL. CORP. CODE
1 25000-804, 27000-203 (Deering 1962, Supp. 1974); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 125-
1-1 to -1-29 (1963, Supps. 1965, 1969); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 36-320 to -347
(1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 7301-29 (1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 1 11,101-29 (July
23, 1973)); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-2401 to -2418 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 517.01-
.33 (1972, Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 97-101 to -122, 97-9901 (Supp. 1973);
HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 485-1 to -25 (1968, Supp. 1973); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1401 to
-1462 (1967, Supp. 1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121A, §§ 137.1-.19 (Smith-Hurd 1960,
Supp. 1974); IND. CODE §§ 23-2-1-1 to -2-3 (1971); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 502.1-.31
(1949, Supp. 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1252 to -1275 (1964, Supp. 1972); Ky.
REV. STAT. §§ 292.310-.991 (1971, Supp. 1973); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:701-:720
(1965, Supp. 1974); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 751-881 (1964, Supp. 1973); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 32A, §§ 13-44 (1971); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 110A, §§ 101-417 (Supp.
1974); MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.776(101)-(418), 19.781-.784 (1964, Supp. 1974);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80A.01-.31 (Supp. 1974); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-71-1 to -57
(1972, Supp. 1973); Mo. REV. STAT. § 409.101-.418 (1969, Supp. 1973); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. §§ 15-2001 to -2025 (1967, Supp. 1973); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 8-1101 to
-1124 (1970); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 90.010-.210 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 421:1-
:41 (1968, Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:3-47 to -76 (1970, Supp. 1974); N.M.
STAT. ANN. If 48-16-1 to -21, 48-18-16 to -35 (1966, Supp. 1973); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw
15 339 to 339-f, 352 to 359-h (McKinney 1968, Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78-
1 to -24 (1965, Supp. 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-04-01 to -20 (1960, Supp. 1973);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1707.01-.99, 1708.01-.99 (Page 1964, Supp. 1973); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1-504 (1965, Supp. 1973); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 59.005-.995
(1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 1-101 to -704 (Supp. 1974); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit.
10, if 851-95 (Supp. 1973); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 7-11-1 to -30 (1969); S.C. CODE
ANN. H§ 62-1 to -319 (1962, Supp. 1973); S.D. CoMPILED LAws ANN. §§ 47-31-1 to
-146 (1967, Supp. 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-1601 to -1651 (1964, Supp. 1973);
TEx. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. arts. 581-1 to -39 (1964, Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN.
If 61-1-1 to -30 (1968, Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4201-41 (1970, Supp.
1974); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-501 to -527.3 (1973, Supp. 1974); WAH. REV. CODE
ANN. 51 21.20.005-.940 (1961, Supp. 1973); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32-1-101 to 4-418
(Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 551.01-.69 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
If 17-117.1 to -117.29 (1965, Supp. 1973). For an analysis of the blue sky laws in
force before the drafting of the Uniform Securities Act in 1956, see L. Loss & E.
COWEI-rr, BLUE SKY LAw (1958) [hereinafter cited as Loss & CowETT]. A revised
abridgment of the material in Loss & CowETrr 3-42, 180-244 may be found in I L. Loss,
SEcuRmTEs REGULATION 23-107 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
The Uniform Securities Act has been adopted in whole or in major part in thirty-
three jurisdictions: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, the District of
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criminal penalties2 and civil liabilities upon anyone who offers4 or
sells5 a security in the state in violation of the securities registration
Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 1 BLuE SKY L. REP.
% 4901 (July 22, 1974). Hereinafter, citations will be made to the Uniform Securities
Act rather than to the corresponding sections of the blue sky laws of these states. The
entire text of the Uniform Act, along with the Official Comments of the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, may be found in the following
sources: Loss & Cowrr 245-420 (draftsmen's commentary also included); 7 UNIFORM
LAws ANNOTATED 691-795 (master ed. 1970, Supp. 1974); 1 BLUE S&Y L. REP.
4901-53 (1971).
2. E.g., UNIFoRM Sacumims Aar § 409; CAL. CORP. CODE § 25540 (Deering
Supp. 1974); FiA. STAT. ANN. § 517.302 (1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch, 121%, § 137.14
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); Onio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1707.44(C), .99 (Page 1964); Tpx.
REv. CMv STAT. ANN. art. 581-29.B (Supp. 1974). See generally 1 Loss 38-42; Loss
& Cow=sr 21-26, 3 87-89.
3. E.g., UNIFoRM SncnRimns Acr §§ 410(a)(1), (b), modeled in part on Securi-
ties Act of 1933 §§ 12(1), 15, 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(1), 77o (1970), and Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25503-04 (Deer-
ing Supp. 1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.21 (1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1213a, §
137.13.A (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43 (Page 1964);
Tux. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33.A(l) (1964). The blue sky laws of New Hamp-
shire and Rhode Island do not expressly impose civil liability upon one who offers or
sells a security in violation of the securities registration requirements of the laws. New
York's Martin Act, which does not require the registration of securities, does not ex-
pressly impose civil liability for offers or sales made in violation of the antifraud pro-
visions or broker-dealer licensing requirements of the Act. For a discussion of implied
liability under the laws of these states, and of other states before they adopted express
liability provisions, see 3 Loss 1661-69; Loss & CowEIr 155-62; Toll, Civil Remedies
of Purchasers of Securities Under New Hampshire Law, 15 N.H.BJ. 123 (1974). See
generally 3 Loss 1631-82; Loss & CowErr 129-79, 389-95.
4. Mo. REv. STAT. § 409.401 (1969), following verbatim UNIFORM SECUTrrIS
Acr § 401(j) (2), defines "offer" in broad terms, characteristic of most securities laws:
When used in this act, unless the context otherwise requires:
0) (2) "Offer"-or "offer to sell" includes every attempt or offer to dispose
of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security for
value.
This definition was modeled on Securities Act of 1933 § 2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3)
(1970), formerly ch. 38, tit. I, § 2(3), 48 Stat. 74 (1933). Accord, CAL. CoRP. CODE
25017(b) (Deering Supp. 1974). See generally 1 Loss 181, 223-24, 512-46; Loss &
Cownr= 343-48.
5. Mo. REv. STAT.. § 409.401(j) (1) (1969), following verbatim UNIFoRM SEtni-
rrms Acr § 401(j) (1), provides that when used in the Act, unless otherwise required
by context, "'[s]ale' or 'sell' includes every contract of sale of, contract to sell, or dispo-
sition of, a security or interest in a security for value." This definition was modeled
on Securities Act of 1933 § 2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1970), formerly ch. 38, tit. I,
§ 2(3), 48 Stat. 74 (1933). Accord, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25017(a) (Deering Supp.
1974). Nine states define "sale" or "sell"-so as to encompass not only the above defini-https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss3/2
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requirements6 of the law. Most blue sky laws, however, contain no
provision explicitly defining when an offer or sale is made "in the
state."7  In the absence of such provisions, courts have resorted to a
traditional choice-of-law sort of analysis to determine whether a given
transaction having contacts with more than one state falls within the
scope of a particular state's law.8 The constitutional power of the states
tion of "sale" or "sell," but also the definition of "offer" or "offer to sell," note 4 supra,
and do not define "offer" separately. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.02(3) (1972); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 121%, § 137.2-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); Omo Rnv. CODE ANN. §§
1707.01(C)(1), (2) (Page Supp. 1973); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-4.E (1964).
See generally 1 Loss 181, 223-24, 512-46; Loss & CowETr 343-48.
6. E.g., UNIFORM SEC uTIs Acr § 301; CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25110, 25120,
25130 (Deering Supp. 1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.07 (1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
121 , § 137.5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.07 (Page 1964);
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-7 (1964).
All jurisdictions except four--Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Nevada (as to
interstate offerings), and New York-require the registration of securities. The details
of the registration process, however, differ widely, as do the grounds for denial or revo-
cation of registration. Of the thirty-three jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform
Securities Act in whole or in major part, see note 1 supra, all but the District of Co-
lumbia and Nevada have adopted the general requirement of securities registration and
at least part of the registration process contained in UNIFORM SEcuRIris ACT §§ 301-
06. The provisions of the Uniform Act as adopted in these jurisdictions, however, are
not truly uniform because of numerous omissions of, additions to, or variations from
the language of the Uniform Act.
Furthermore, all states that register securities exempt certain types of securities, and
all securities sold in certain kinds of transactions, from their registration requirements.
Variations between states in the content of these exemptions and in the underlying def-
inition of "security" further complicate matters. In short, generalizations about the de-
tails of registration requirements are impossible, and the law of each state must be con-
silted to determine the requirements in that state. See generally 1 Loss 43-67; Loss
& CowErT 26-128, 256-60, 282-84; 1-3 BLUE SKY L. REP. passim.
7. 1 Loss 85-89; Loss & Cowpr 224-29; see note 14 infra and accompanying text.
8. Standard conflict-of-laws analysis, though in a state of confusion in this area,
generally determines the validity of a contract having substantial contacts with more
than one state in accordance with the law of one of three places: the place of contract-
ing, the place of performance, or the place with reference to which the parties con-
tracted. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW §§ 143-45 (1968); R. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARlY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 263-75 (1971). No one of these rules can
be said to be the sole rule adopted in any given jurisdiction, since "[tihe typical situ-
ation [has been] . . . combined acceptance of all three rules." R. LEFLAR, supra § 145,
at 358. Recently some courts have adopted another rule, which would determine an is-
sue as to the validity of a contract by reference to the law of the state that has the
"moat significant contacts" with the contract with respect to the issue in question. R.
LELAY, supra § 147; R. WEINTRAUB, supra at 275-80. Compare RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1969), with RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF
LAws § 332 (1934). For an excellent discussion of the various rules, authorities for
the rules, and Missouri cases adopting the different rules, see In re Estate of De Gheest,
362 Mo. 634, 243 S.W.2d 83 (1951).
Washington University Open Scholarship
424 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1974:421
to regulate interstate transactions has not been restricted by federal
regulation, because the federal securities laws expressly preserve the
Any interstate offer or sale of securities may fall within the scope of, and thus may
violate, the blue sky laws of more than one state. In the typical blue sky "conflicts"
case, "the buyer . . . alleges the violation of a particular statute, which often happens
to be the forum's, and the question is not whether that statute applies in the face of
some other governing law but simply whether it applies at all as a matter of statutory
construction." I Loss 69; Loss & CowET 189-90. Professor Loss has commented that
the blue sky cases dealing with this question "defy generalization." He gives several
reasons for this "bewildering state of affairs": (1) general confusion in this area of con-
flict-of-laws analysis; (2) conflicting policy considerations-namely, the courts' desire
on the one hand to uphold, if possible, an agreement which the parties intended to be
valid, and on the other hand to give full effect to the public policy, implicit in blue
sky laws, of affording protection to investors; (3) variations in the statutory language
upon which the cases were decided; and (4) the numerous combinations and coinci-
dences of the place of contract, place of performance, and place of solicitation in the
reported cases. 1 Loss 68-71; Loss & CowETr 186-92. The following classification of
the holdings in these cases draws heavily upon the analytical framework developed in
Loss, The Conflict of Laws and the Blue Sky Laws, 71 HAav. L. REv. 209, 228-41
(1957), in Loss & CowErr 197-210.
The most numerous group of cases points to the place of contracting as determinative
of whether or not a given interstate transaction falls within the scope of a particular
state's law. E.g., Brocalsa Chem. Co. v. Langsenkamp, 32 F.2d 725, 729-30 (6th Cir.
1929); Hohn v. Peters, 216 Cal. 406, 14 P.2d 519 (1932); People ex rel. Brundage v.
Hill Top Metals Mining Co., 300 Ill. 564, 574-76, 133 N.E. 303, 307 (1921); Carolina
Palisades, Inc. v. Manly, 214 Ind. 565, 570, 16 N.E.2d 886, 888 (1938); First State Bank
v. Wilson, 246 Ky. 635, 639-40, 55 S.W.2d 657, 658-59 (1932); Colt v. Fradkin, -
Mass. -, -, 281 N.E.2d 213, 215-16 (1972) (alternative holding); Somers v. Commer-
cial Fin. Corp., 245 Mass. 286, 288, 139 N.E. 837, 838 (1923); Wilder Nat'l Tavern
Sys. v. Jillson, 256 Mich. 479, 240 N.W. 6 (1932); Guynn v. Shulters, 223 Miss. 232,
242, 78 So. 2d 114, 116 (1955); United States Bond & Fin. Corp. v. National Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n of America, 80 Utah 62, 12 P.2d 758, rehearing denied, 80 Utah 70, 17
P.2d 238 (1932); In re Estate of Suckow, 192 Wis. 124, 126-29, 212 N.W. 280, 281-
82 (1927).
Some cases have held that the place of performance (i.e. delivery or issuance of the
security) determines whether an interstate transaction is subject to the law of a partic-
ular state. E.g., In re Motor Prods. Mfg. Corp., 90 F.2d 8, 10-11 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 302 U.S. 695 (1937); Los Angeles Fisheries, Inc. v. Crook, 47 F.2d 1031 (9th
Cir. 1931); Robinson v. Cupples Container Co., 316 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (N.D. Cal.
1970); Ward v. Home Royalty Ass'n, 142 Kan. 546, 551, 50 P.2d 992, 995 (1935); see
Sandor v. Ruffer, Ballan & Co., 309 F. Supp. 849, 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (alternative
holding); Robbins v. Pacific E. Corp., 8 Cal. 2d 241, 277-84, 65 P.2d 42, 60-64 (1937).
But cf. Mau v. Montana Pac. Oil Co., 16 Del. Ch. 114, 119-22, 141 A. 828, 831-32
(Ch. 1928).
A few cases have held that a contract of sale arising out of illegal solicitations in
the state of the purchaser's residence, but consummated in a state where the sale would
otherwise be valid, is subject to the law of the place of solicitation and therefore void-
able at the purchaser's election. Green v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 479 F.2d 462
(7th Cir. 1973); Doherty v. Bartlett, 81 F.2d 920, 927-28 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 298
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss3/2
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concurrent jurisdiction of the states over such transactions. 9 Given the
states' constitutional power to regulate interstate offers and sales of
securities, and in view of the confusion resulting from the courts' use
of conflict-of-laws analysis to determine the scope of particular states'
laws,1" the draftsmen of the Uniform Securities Act attempted to pro-
U.S. 676 (1936); Stem v. National City Co., 25 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Minn. 1938),
aff'd sub nom. City Co. v. Stem, 110 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1940), rev'd per curiam on
other grounds, 312 U.S. 666 (1941); Intermountain Title Guar. Co. v. Egbert, 52 Idaho
402, 409-11, 16 P.2d 390, 393 (1932); Lewis v. Bricker, 235 Mich. 656, 662-63, 209
N.W. 832, 834 (1926) (semble); see Rhines v. Skinner Packing Co., 108 Neb. 105, 108-
09, 187 N.W. 874, 875 (1922). But see Robbins v. Pacific E. Corp., 8 Cal. 2d 241,
277-84, 65 P.2d 42, 60-64 (1937).
Finally, a few courts seem to have applied, or reasoned along the lines of, the "most
significant contacts" test to determine whether an interstate transaction is subject to the
blue sky law of a particular state. Gaillard v. Field, 381 F.2d 25, 28 (10th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1968), noted in 81 HARv. L. REV. 1864 (1968); cf. Green
v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., supra at 465; Rhines v. Skinner Packing Co., supra at
108-09, 187 N.W. at 875.
Express choice-of-law provisions in contracts for the sale of securities did not appear
in any of the reported blue sky cases until May 1973. In that month, the United States
District Court for the District of South Dakota held inapplicable a provision in a securi-
ties purchase agreement, by which the parties purported to choose the law of New York
to govern the transaction. The court held that to permit the choice-of-law stipulation
to determine whether South Dakota law would apply would provide an effective means
of circumventing legislation designed to protect South Dakota citizens, and thus would
clearly be against the public policy of the forum state. Boehnen v. Walston & Co., 358
F. Supp. 537, 541 (D.S.D. 1973); accord, Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., 366 F. Supp.
559, 574-76 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
See generally 1 Loss 67-89; Loss & Cow=rr 180-229; 31 CALIF. L. REV. 95 (1942);
51 HARY. L. REV. 155 (1937). For an analysis of the scope of blue sky laws and their
applicability to interstate transactions having minimal contacts with the regulating state,
see Weinstein, Problems in the Field of State Securities Regulation, 3 B.C. IND. & COM.
L. REV. 381, 381-403 (1962).
9. The jurisdiction-preserving clauses in the federal acts are as follows: Securities
Act of 1933 § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a),
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 § 21, 15
U.S.C. § 79u (1970); Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 326, 15 U.S.C. § 77zzz (1970);
Investment Company Act of 1940 § 50, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-49 (1970); Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 § 222, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-18a (1970). See also Cowett, Federal-State Re-
lationships in Securities Regulation, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 287, 289-90 (1959); Smith,
The Relation of Federal and State Securities Laws, 4 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 241, 243
(1937); Smith, State "Blue-Sky" Laws and the Federal Securities Acts, 34 MICH. L. REv.
1135, 1158-62 (1936). For an excellent discussion of the debate over the proper
federal-state relationship in the area of securities regulation, and a proposal for "partial
preemption" of the field in the new Federal Securities Code, see Bateman, State Secur-
ities Registration: An Unresolved Dilemma and a Suggestion for the Federal Securities
Code, 27 Sw. L.J. 759 (1973).
10. See note 8 supra.
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vide in section 41411 a simple and explicit description of the transactions
to which the Act would apply.12
Of the thirty-three jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Act
in whole or in major part,'3 twenty-one have included in their acts the
general scope-of-act provisions contained in section 414 of the Uniform
Act. 4 None of these provisions received judicial construction until
1973,11 when the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
11. The text of the relevant parts of UNiORM SEcURITIms AcT § 414 is identical
to that of Mo. REv. STAT. § 409.415 (1969), quoted in note 21 infra, except for the
proviso to § 409.415(c), which was added by the Missouri General Assembly.
12. Loss has described the premises underlying the specific provisions of UNIIoRM
Snctmrrms Acr § 414 as follows:
(1) that to some extent maximum statutory coverage must yield to the goal
of simplicity; (2) that the scope of the act in interstate transactions should
be made as explicit as possible; (3) that, above all, it should be made certain
that nobody who is acting in good faith and is properly advised will be en-
trapped by having a law apply other than the law or laws he has satisfied; and
(4) that, subject to the first three premises, the conflict-of-laws provisions
should not depart unnecessarily from such existing patterns as can be traced
in the cases. ... . [which] point either to the place of solicitation or to the
place of contract.
1 Loss 87 (footnotes omitted); Loss & CowETr 226-27. For a discussion of the choice-
of-law mechanism of § 414, see D. CAv.Rs, THE CHOICE-OF-IAW PRocEss 241-45
(1965); 1 Loss 85-89; Loss & CowVEr 224-29, 401-05. For an argument supporting
the propositions that § 414 should properly be termed a scope-of-act, and not a conflict-
of-laws, provision, and that § 414 by no means resolves potential conflicts between the
laws of two states, either or both of which have adopted the Uniform Act, see Hill,
Some Comments on the Uniform Securities Act, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 661, 685-89 (1961).
13. See notes 1 & 6 supra.
14. A.AsA STAT. § 45.55.260 (1962); Aax. STAT. ANN. § 67-1260 (1966); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-1-25 (1963) (includes provisions paralleling §§ 414(a) & (b),
but not §§ 414(c) & (d), of Uniform Act); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-2414 (1973); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 32A, § 38 (1971); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 110A, § 414 (Supp. 1974);
McH. STAT. ANN. § 19.776(414) (Supp. 1974); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 80A.27 (Supp.
1974); Mo. REv. STAT. § 409.415 (1969); NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.210 (1973); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 49:3-51 (1970); OiLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 413 (1965); ORE. REV. STAT. §§
59.335, .345 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-702 (Supp. 1974); P.R. LAWS ANN.
tit. 10, § 894 (Supp. 1973); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-18 (1962, Supp. 1973); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 61-1-26 (1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 32-4-414 (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 551.66 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-117.26 (1965). The new
North Carolina Securities Act, which will supersede the present Securities Law on April
1, 1975, is modeled on the Uniform Securities Act and contains a provision correspond-
ing to § 414 of the Uniform Act. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78-27 (2 BLUE SKY L. REP.
36,221 (May 7, 1974)). In addition, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25008 (Deering Supp. 1974)
provides a scope-of-act scheme similar to that of UNIFORM SEcuurrms ACr § 414.
15. Two earlier decisions contain passing references to the scope-of-act sections of
the Utah Uniform Securities Act and the Maryland Securities Act, but no issue in the
construction of these sections was raised in either case. Chaney v. Western States Title
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decided Kreis v. Mates Investment Fund, Inc.Y6 Part I of this Note
will describe the Kreis court's construction of section 409.415 of the
Missouri Uniform Securities Act. Part II will analyze certain inade-
quacies in the court's reasoning in construing section 409.415(c) and
will suggest additional reasons supporting the court's construction of
that section. Part I will similarly analyze the court's treatment of sec-
tion 409.415(d). Drawing upon the preceding analysis, Part IV will
recommend specific modifications of the language of section 414 of the
Uniform Securities Act, in order to avoid future constructional prob-
lems similar to those encountered in Kreis.
I. SUMMARY OF K1RIS V. MATES INVESTMENT FUND, INc.
Kreis, a Missouri citizen and resident, learned of the existence of
Mates Investment Fund, an open-end investment company incorpo-
rated in Delaware, by reading a laudatory article about the Fund in a
national financial magazine. Having had no communication with the
Fund or any of its representatives, Kreis sent a letter from Missouri
to the Fund's principal office in New York, enclosing his personal
check for $20,000 and requesting the Fund to sell him as many shares
as were purchasable for that amount. Upon receiving Kreis' letter, the
Fund posted the sale and issuance of shares to Kreis on its books,' 7
Ins. Co., 292 F. Supp. 376, 377 & n.7, 380 & n.18 (D. Utah 1968); Shulton, Inc. v.
Rubin, 239 Md. 669, 687, 212 A.2d 476, 486 (1965).
In the first conflict-of-laws case arising in a jurisdiction with the scope-of-act provi-
sion, the court disposed of the case by general conflicts analysis (specifically, by use
of the public policy doctrine) and did not refer to the possibly relevant section of the
Oklahoma Act, OKA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 413 (1965). Gaillard v. Field, 381 F.2d 25
(10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1968), noted in 81 HARv. L. REv. 1864
(1968); 4 Loss 2260 (Supp. 1969). See also note 163 infra.
16. 473 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1973).
17. In 1968 the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted a rule requiring at
least once daily computation of the net asset value of investment companies registered
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, in order to minimize possible dilution of
the value of outstanding securities of such companies. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (1974).
This computation determines the price at which redeemable securities of registered in-
vestment companies may be sold, redeemed, or repurchased by the companies themselves
or by authorized agents or principal underwriters of the companies. Id.; see Investment
Company Act of 1940 §§ 22(a), (c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-22(a), (c) (1970); 1 Loss 403-
04.
In the principal case, Kreis' letter was received on June 5, 1968. On June 6, the
Fund-which was registered under the Investment Company Act-posted the sale and
issuance of shares to Kreis on its books, and an entry reflecting Kreis' purchase was
included in the computation of the Fund's current net asset valpe on that day. On or
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deposited the check, and mailed from New York, to Kreis in Missouri,
a prospectus,18 a confirmation of sale, and later the certificate for the
shares purchased. Kreis subsequently learned that the Fund's shares
were not registered for sale in Missouri, 19 and brought an action for
rescission against the Fund and its president under the Missouri
Uniform Securities Act.20 Defendants contended that the Missouri Act
did not apply to the transaction, because -there was neither an offer to
buy nor an acceptance thereof in Missouri, within the meaning of the
Act. 1 The federal district court22 rendered judgment for defendants,
after June 7, the Fund deposited Kreis' check, and on or after June 7, the Fund mailed
to Kreis the letter of confirmation, dated June 5. Kreis v. Mates Inv. Fund, Inc., 335
F. Supp. 1299, 1301 (E.D. Mo. 1971); App. at 18, Kreis v. Mates Inv. Fund, Inc., supra;
Brief for Appellant at 5, Brief for Appellees at 2, Kreis v. Mates Inv. Fund, Inc., 473
F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1973).
18. The Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1970), provides in
part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . to carry or
cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce any .
security [with respect to which a reg7stration statement has been filed] for the
purpose of sale or for delivery after sale, unless accompanied or preceded by
a prospectus ....
19. Mo. REv. STAT. § 409.301 (1969) provides:
It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in this state unless
(1) it is registered under this act or (2) the security or transaction is exempted
under section 409.402,
The Fund did not contend that either its securities or the transaction with Kreis was
exempt under § 409.402.
20. Mo. REv. STAT. § 409.411 (1969) provides in relevant part:
(a) Any person who . . . offers or sells a security in violation of section
. . . 409.301 . . . is liable to the person buying the security from him, who
may sue either at law or in equity to recover the consideration paid for the
security, together with interest at six percent per year from the date of pay-
ment, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees, less the amount of any income re-
ceived on the security, upon the tender of the security ....
(b) . . . [Elvery partner, officer, or director of such a seller [liable under
the preceding paragraph] . . . is also liable jointly and severally with and to
the same extent as the seller ....
21. Mo. REv. STAT. § 409.415 (1969) (emphasis added) defines the scope of the
Act as follows:
(a) Sections 409.101, 409.201(a), 409.301, 409.405, and 409.411 apply to
persons who sell or offer to sell when (1) an offer to sell is made in this state,
or (2) an offer to buy is made and accepted in this state.
(b) Sections 409.101, 409.201(a), and 409.405 apply to persons who buy
or offer to buy when (1) an offer to buy is made in this state, or (2) an offer
to sell is made and accepted in this state.
(c) For the purpose of this section, an offer to sell or to buy is made in
this state, whether or not either party is then present in this state, when the
offer (1) originates from this state or (2) is directed by the offeror to this
state and received at the place to which it is directed (or at any post office
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holding that there was an offer to buy but no acceptance thereof in
Missouri. 23  On appeal the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
and held that plaintiff's offer to buy was "made in Missouri" within the
meaning of the Act, and that the confirmation of the sale-mailed by
defendant in New York to plaintiff in Missouri-constituted "accept-
ance" of plaintiff's offer in Missouri, within the meaning of the Act.24
The Kreis case presented questions of first impression25 in the con-
struction of a statutory provision substantially identical to section 414
of the Uniform Securities Act. Section 409.415(a)26 of the Missouri
Act makes the substantive provisions of the Act, including securities
registration requirements, applicable to sellers when an offer to sell is
made in the state, or when an offer to buy is made and accepted in
the state. The court in Kreis had to decide whether an offer to buy had
been made and accepted in Missouri.2 7  Reasoning that plaintiffs offer
in this state in the case of a mailed offer); provided, however, if an offer is
directed to an offeree in a state other than this state and that offer would be
lawful if made in such other state, then for the purposes of this section such
offer is not made in this state.
(d) For the purpose of this section, an offer to buy or to sell is accepted
in this state when acceptance (1) is communicated to the offeror in this state
and (2) has not previously been communicated to the offeror, orally or in writ-
ing, outside this state; and acceptance is communicated to the offeror in this
state, whether or not either party is then present in this state, when the offeree
directs it to the offeror in this state reasonably believing the offeror to be in
this state and it is received at the place to which it is directed (or at any post
office in this state in the case of a mailed acceptance).
Except for the addition of the proviso at the end of § (c), this section is a verbatim
adoption of UNIFORM SEcUrITIES AcT § 414.
22. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970), on the basis
of diversity of citizenship and the required jurisdictional amount in controversy. See
note 31 infIra.
23. Kreis v. Mates Inv. Fund, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1299, 1304-05 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
24. Kreis v. Mates Inv. Fund, Inc., 473 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1973).
25. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
26. For the text of the relevant parts of Mo. Rv. STAT. § 409.415 (1969), see note
21 supra.
27. In the district court, plaintiff had also argued that the Act was applicable to
this transaction because an offer to sell had been made in Missouri by (1) circulation
in Missouri of the magazine article describing the Fund, and (2) the mailing by the
Fund of a prospectus to plaintiff in Missouri. The district court disposed of the first
contention on the ground that the magazine article was clearly exempted from the def-
inition of "offer" by Mo. REv. STAT. § 409.415(e) (1969), which provides:
An offer to sell or to buy is not made in this state when (1) the publisher
circulates or there is circulated on his behalf in this state any bona fide news-
paper or other publication of general, regular, and paid circulation which is
not published in this state, or which is published in this state but has had more
than two-thirds of its circulation outside this state during the past twelve
429
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to buy "originated from Missouri" because it was contained in his letter
mailed from Missouri, the court concluded that the offer to buy was
"made in Missouri" within the meaning of section 409.415(c), unless
excluded from the definition by the proviso to that section.28 The
proviso in effect exempts from the class of offers "made in Missouri"
any offer originating from Missouri but directed to an offeree in
another state where the offer would be lawful. The court decided that
this proviso applies only to offers to sell and therefore held that plain-
tiff's offer to buy was "made in Missouri. 29
months, or (2) a radio or television program originating outside this state is
received in this state.
Kreis v. Mates Inv. Fund, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (E.D. Mo. 1971). The parties
had stipulated that the magazine in question, Barron's National Business and Financial
Weekly, was published outside Missouri and for twelve months prior to the appearance
of the article had had less than one-third of its total circulation in Missouri. Id. at
1301. (The apparent redundancy in this stipulation probably reflected the parties' de-
sire that the court not become involved with the construction of § 409.415(e).) The
parties had also stipulated that the author of the article had no interest in the Fund,
received no fees, salaries, wages, or commissions from the Fund, and was not an agent
of any type for the Fund or for its president. Id.
Plaintiff's second argument was rejected on the ground that the Fund, in mailing a
prospectus to plaintiff, was merely responding to plaintiffs offer to buy, and was doing
only what was required by federal law. Id. at 1303; see note 18 supra.
On appeal plaintiff abandoned both of these arguments and contended only that the
district court had erred in holding that plaintiff's offer to buy was not "accepted in Mis-
souri." Brief for Appellant at 8, Defendants, however, renewed their argument that
plaintiff's offer to buy was neither "made" nor "accepted in Missouri." Brief for Ap-
pellees at 8. Thus the correctness of the district court's holdings on both the making
and the acceptance of the offer to buy was put in issue.
28. 473 F.2d at 1311.
29. Id. at 1312. The court reached this result by reference to the definition
of "offer" in Mo. REv. STAT. § 409.401(j)(2) (1969), quoted in note 4 supra. The
court then observed that this conclusion found support in the purpose of the proviso and
in the "practical reality" that offers to buy are rarely illegal under any law. 473 F.2d
at 1312. But see note 51 -infra. According to a member and the chairman of the com-
mittee that drafted the Missouri Act, the proviso to § 409.415(c) was added to eliminate
the "problem" of a Missouri broker "who called or wrote a customer in Illinois offering
to sell such customer a security which was registered under the Securities Law of Illinois
but not registered for sale in Missouri. .. ." The proviso was meant to exempt such
a broker from the civil liabilities and criminal penalties that he otherwise might incur
under the Missouri Act. Mills & Jensen, The Missouri Uniform Securities Act, 24 J.
Mo. B. 60, 68 (1968); see Logan, Missouri's New Uniform Securities Act and Secur-
ities Regulations, 37 U. Mo. K.C.L. Rv. 1, 6 (1969), reprinted in Blue Skyways and
Byways of Missouri, 25 J. Mo. B. 460, 464 (1969). The district court had reached the
same result on this issue through the same reasoning. 335 F. Supp. at 1304. For
a more exhaustive consideration of the constructional problems raised by the proviso to
§ 409,415(c), see notes 33-121 infra and accompanying text.
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The court next considered whether the offer was "accepted in
Missouri" within the meaning of section 409.415(d). Observing that
the section defines "acceptance in this state" solely for the purpose of
determining the scope of the Act, the court reasoned that the emphasis
under the section is upon communication s0 of acceptance. The court
then purported to apply the "plain language"3' of the Act, and held that
since the Fund's letter of confirmation was the original and only com-
munication of its acceptance received by Kreis, the letter constituted
"acoeptance in Missouri" for the purpose of section 409.415.32
The reasoning through which the Kreis court arrived at its two
holdings is subject to criticism on several grounds. The next two Parts
of this Note will examine in detail the possible objections to the court's
reasoning and will explain why these objections are not necessarily fatal
to the ultimate disposition in Kreis.
30. Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1957) defines "communicate"
as "to make known," "to give by way of information," "to make common to both parties
or objects involved the knowledge or quality conveyed."
31. 473 F.2d at 1312. If a federal court sitting in a diversity action is faced with
a question of first impression in the construction of a state statute, the court must decide
the issue in the same way the state's highest court would, if it were faced with the issue.
See, e.g., 1A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE I 0.309[2] (2d ed. 1965, Supp. 1973); C.
WxUGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF FEDERAL CoURTs § 58 (2d ed. 1970); Note, Federal
Interpretation of State Law-An Argument for Expanded Scope of Inquiry, 53 MINN.
L. REv. 806, 814-19 (1969). The Supreme Court of Missouri, in construing statutes,
has long followed a rule of "ascertain[ing] the intention of the lawmakers from the
words used, if possible, ascribing to the language its plain meaning, and ...effectu-
atuing] the intent found." State ex rel. MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rooney, 406 S.W.2d 1,
3 (Mo. 1966) (emphasis added); accord, State ex rel. Wright v. Carter, 319 S.W.2d 596,
599 (Mo. 1958); Cummins v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 334 Mo. 672, 684, 66 S.W.2d
920, 925 (1933). The adoption in Missouri of this hybrid of the "legislative intent"
and "plain meaning" rules of statutory construction justifies to some extent the "plain
language" approach of the court in Kreis. Cf. note 92 infra. But see notes 139-41 infra
and accompanying text. For a description and comparison of the "meaning" and "in-
tent" approaches to statutory construction, see 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STAT-
uTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 45.05-.08 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973) [hereinafter cited as
SUTHERLAND].
32. 473 F.2d at 1313. The court "note[d], in passing," that a similar construction
of § 409.415(d) was arrived at by a Missouri commentator. Id., citing Logan, supra
note 29, at 6, 25 J. Mo. B. at 464. The court found further support for its conclusion
in UrIoRM SEcuarrEEs Acr §§ 414(a)-(f), Comment 8. See note 154 infra and ac-
companying text. It is indicative of the ambiguity of Comment 8, however, that the
district court also found support in that comment for its holding that the letter of con-
firmation did not constitute "acceptance in this state" within the meaning of Mo. REV.
STAT. 1 409.415 (1969). 335 F. Supp. at 1305.
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I. CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 409.415 (c)
OF THE MIssouRi ACT
33
A. Objections to the Kreis Court's Construction
In determining that the proviso to section 409.415(c) of the Missouri
Act applies only to offers to sell, the Kreis court relied heavily upon
the "plain words" defining "offer" in section 409.401(j)(2) of the
Act.34  The court ignored, however, equally plain words at the begin-
ning of section 409.401, which state that the definitions in that section
apply "unless the context otherwise requires.'3 5  Strong arguments can
be made that the grammatical context of section 409.415(c) and the
policy behind section 409.415(c) (1) do require that the term "offer"
in the proviso include offers to buy as well as offers to sell. The argu-
ments run as follows.
First, the language of section 409.415(c), taken in its entirety, 0 in-
dicates that the proviso should apply to offers to buy. The function
of subsection (c) is to define when an "offer to sell or to buy is made
in this state . . . . 37 This first reference to "offer" in the subsection
expressly encompasses both kinds of offers. Before the proviso is
reached, the term "offer" appears two more times:
when the offer (1) originates from this state or (2) is directed by
the offeror to this state and received at the place to which it is directed
(or at any post office in this state in the case of a mailed offer). .... 38
In each of these instances, "offer" clearly includes both offers to buy
33. The proviso to § 409.415(c) of the Missouri Act was added by the Missouri
General Assembly when it enacted UNIFORM SECURIrIEs Acr § 414(c), see notes 11
& 21 supra, and has no counterpart in the act of any other state that has adopted the
scope-of-act provisions of the Uniform Act, see note 14 supra. Therefore, the following
discussion of the constructional problem raised by the Missouri proviso directly pertains
only to the Missouri Act. The analysis of the purposes of §§ 409.415(c)(1) and
(c) (2), however, is relevant in any state that has adopted the scope-of-act provisions.
See notes 59-89, 93-98 infra and accompanying text. And the discussion in general
should demonstrate that unforeseen constructional problems may result from a state leg-
islature's modification of the language of a Uniform Act, and that a legislature under-
taking such a modification should express its intent with particular precision. Cf. notes
90-121 infra and accompanying text.
34. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
35. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 409.401 (1969) (emphasis added), quoted in part in note 4
supra.
36. For the entire text of § 409.415(c), see note 21 supra.
37. Mo. Rmv. STAT. § 409.415(c) (1969) (emphasis added).
38. Id.
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and offers to sell.39 The last three appearances of the word are in the
proviso:
provided, however, if an offer is directed -to an offeree in a state other
than this state and that offer would be lawful if made in such other
state, then for the purposes of this section such offer is not made in this
state.40
As a matter of consistency, "offer" should be given the same meaning
in the proviso that it has in the rest of subsection (c)-that is, the pro-
viso should apply to offers to buy as well as offers to sell.4 '
Secondly, the policy that arguably underlies section 409.415(c)(1),
and the purpose of the proviso that is suggested by that policy, both
require that the proviso apply to offers to buy. It is well established
that the primary purpose of blue sky laws is to protect investors in secu-
rities (the "protective" purpose).42  A secondary purpose of the laws,
however, has occasionally been mentioned-to prevent the use of the
regulating state as a base for fraudulent operations or for the sale of
questionable securities to residents of other states (the "preventive"
purpose). 43 Since sections 409.415(a) (1) and (c) (2) make the sub-
39. This reading is required by the sentence structure of § 409.415(c) before the
proviso, and by the use of the phrase "made in this state" in connection with both offers
to buy and offers to sell in §§ 409.415(a) and (b). See note 21 supra.
40. Mo. REv. STAT. § 409.415(c) (1969) (emphasis added).
41. A shorter version of the above argument was unsuccessfully urged by appellees
in Kreis. Brief for Appellees at 8-9, Kreis v. Mates Inv. Fund, Inc., 473 F.2d 1308 (8th
Cir. 1973). In correspondence with the Law Quarterly, Mr. Lewis R. Mills, a member
of the committee that drafted the Missouri Act, has suggested the possible validity of
this argument. Letter from Lewis R. Mills to the Washington University Law Quarterly,
Mar. 18, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Mills Letter).
42. See, e.g., Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550-52 (1917); Covert v.
Cross, 331 S.W.2d 576, 585 (Mo. 1960); Garbo v. Hilleary Franchise Systems, Inc., 479
S.W.2d 491, 499 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972); State ex rel. Sanders v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 235 Mo. App. 729, 734, 143 S.W.2d 483, 484-85 (1940).
43. See 1 Loss 73-74 n.211; 3 id. at 1999-2000 & n.79. Loss & CowETr 211 n.1.
Pursuit of this secondary purpose reflects adoption by the regulating state of a policy
of comity between itself and other states. The regulating state-for example, Mis-
souri-seeks to prevent the use of itself as a base for the victimization of residents
of other states, and in return, Missouri expects other states to prevent their use as bases
for the victimization of Missouri residents. The ultimate objective of the secondary, or
preventive, purpose is thus the same as the objective of the primary, or protective, pur-
pose-protection of Missouri residents. The preventive purpose, however, seeks to
achieve this objective in a much less direct manner than the protective purpose, and it
is helpful to distinguish between the two purposes. The preventive purpose may also
further two minor interests of the regulating state: lightening the burden of administer-
ing the state's blue sky law, by discouraging disreputable traffickers in securities from
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stantive provisions of the Missouri Act applicable to sellers who direct
offers to sell to Missouri residents, it can be argued that the primary
purpose of the Act-protection of Missouri residents-is fully achieved
without the operation of section 409.415(c)(l). Under this view, the
basic policy behind section 409.415(c)(l) is the secondary purpose of
the Act-preventing the use of Missouri as a base of fraudulent opera-
tion. 44 The proviso, which can apply only to section 409.415(c)(1)
and not to section 409.415(c)(2),45 would thus limit the situations in
which Missouri would seek to achieve this secondary purpose. A resi-
dent of another state would not receive greater protection from the
Missouri Act than he does from the act of his own state.40 If this view
of the policy behind section 409.415(c)(1) is correct, then there is no
reason to limit the application of the proviso to offers to sell.47
Despite the apparent force of the two preceding arguments, several
flaws in the policy argument indicate that the court in Kreis probably
reached the proper construction of the proviso to section 409.415(c).
B. Analysis of the Objections
1. The Language Argument
The first objection to the Kreis court's limited construction of the
entering or establishing themselves in the state; and protecting the reputation of the reg-
ulating state in the eyes of sister states.
44. This position finds some support in UNORM SEcrRInEs Acr § 414(a)-(f),
Comment 3. In discussing a hypothetical civil action by a buyer in State B against a
seller in State S, resulting from an offer that originated in State S and was directed to
State B, the Official Comment makes this observation: "Mhe statute of State S . . .
applies to the offer tnder § 414(c) (1), on the theory that State S should not be used
as a base of operations for defrauding persons in other states." The Official Comment,
however, does not even imply that the operation of § 414(c)(1) (§ 409.415(c)(1) of
the Missouri Act) in a different context may not be based upon another policy objective.
See note 89 infra and accompanying text.
45. The proviso concerns offers originating in Missouri but directed to another state,
see text accompanying note 40 supra, whereas § 409.415(c) (2) concerns offers directed
to Missouri, see text accompanying note 38 supra. Therefore, the proviso has no appli-
cation to § 409.415(c) (2).
46. The policy argument above was suggested to the author by Mr. Lewis R. Mills.
See Mills Letter, supra note 41. Appellees in Kreis did no more than hint at the argu-
ment See Brief for Appellees at 9-10.
The purpose of the proviso stated in text would not necessarily entail a total sacrifice
of the policy of comity underlying the preventive purpose of the Act. See note 43 supra.
Missouri would still be entitled to expect other states to prevent their use as bases for
sales to, or purchases from, Missouri residents that would be unlawful in Missouri. But
ef. note 103 infra and accompanying text.
47. See Mills Letter, supra note 41.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss3/2
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proviso-namely, that the language of section 409.415(c) requires
application of the proviso to offers to buy4 8 -is persuasive. In
response to appellees' presentation of this argument in Kreis,49 appel-
lant observed that "an offer to buy could in itself rarely ever be illegal
under any state or Federal securities law." 50  Although appellant did
not elaborate upon this observation, he could have based two possi-
ble-but unsound-counterarguments upon it.
First, it could be argued that because the Missouri legislature
phrased the proviso in terms of offers that "would be lawful" in the
state to which they were directed, the legislature was not contemplating
offers to buy and did not intend the proviso to apply to offers to buy.
This argument is unsound for two reasons: (1) the premise upon which
it is based-that offers to buy per se are rarely unlawful in any state-
is invalid;5' and (2) the argument ignores the possibility that the legis-
48. See notes 36-41 supra and accompanying text.
49. See note 41 supra.
50. Reply Brief for Appellant at 4, Kreis v. Mates Inv. Fund, Inc., 473 F.2d 1308
(8th Cir. 1973). But see note 51 infra.
51. Of the thirty-three jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Securities
Act, see note I supra, all have enacted, either verbatim or with minor modification, the
section of the Uniform Act that prohibits certain fraudulent practices "in connection
with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security." UNIFORM SEcuRTis Acr § 101. In
this context, it is clear that "offer" is used in the statutorily defined sense of "offer to
sell." Therefore, under the laws of these states, a fraudulent offer to buy that does not
result in a consummated transaction is not unlawful. In seven "non-uniform" states,
however, the statutory language seems broad enough to prohibit fraudulent offers to buy
not resulting in actual purchases. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1991 (1967); CAL.
Corp. CoDE § 25401 (Deering Supp. 1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 36-338(a)
(1972); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-71-43(b) (1972); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1644(B)
(1964); Tnx. RPv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-29.C (Supp. 1974); cf. N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAw § 339-a, 352-c (1968).
In two other situations not involving fraud, an offer to buy could, in itself, violate
a state securities law. First, if the person making the offer to buy comes within the
statutory definition of "broker-dealer" or "agent," e.g., UNIwoRM SEcunrrms AcT §
401(b), (c), and has not complied with the broker-dealer or agent registration require-
ment in the state to which the offer is directed, e.g., id. § 201(a), then the offer to
buy is probably unlawful. Secondly, if the person making the offer to buy has been
enjoined by the target state from engaging in specified acts or practices that violate the
state's blue sky law, see, e.g., id. § 408, then the offer to buy may fall within the scope
of the injunction and therefore be unlawful. Even if an unconsumnated offer to buy
would not itself be a violation of the state's law, the possibility that an offer to buy
could lead to a purchase without any further action on the offeror's part may bring the
offer to buy within the scope of an injunction against purchases. There is, however,
no authority on this question.
At the federal level, the Williams Act of 1968 regulates offers to buy that constitute
"tender offers," and makes such tender offers unlawful under certain circumstances. Se-
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lature used the "would be lawful" language as a shorthand method of
bringing most offers to buy, and some offers to sell, within the scope
of the proviso.
The second counterargument that appellant could have made is that
inclusion of offers to buy within the scope of the proviso severely strains
the meaning of other language in section 409.415(c). Arguably, appli-
cation of the proviso to offers to buy would exclude from the class of
offers "made in" Missouri any offer to buy that originates from Missouri
but is directed to another state.5 2  The result of a broad reading of
the word "offer" in the proviso would thus be the restriction of the
operative scope of section 409.415(c)(l) to offers to sell. If section
409.415(c)(1) is so restricted, then the single word "offer" appearing
immediately before clause (1) would have to assume a split meaning:
as used in clause (1) it would refer only to offers to sell, but as used
in clause (2) it would refer to both offers to buy and offers to sell.
The artificiality of -this double meaning would provide a sound rebuttal
to the language argument for including offers to buy within the scope
of the proviso.
This second counterargument fails for the same reason as the first
counterargument: it proceeds upon the invalid assumption 54 that offers
to buy are rarely, if ever, unlawful. Since there are several situations
in which an offer to buy per se would be unlawful in most states, 5 the
application of the proviso to offers to buy would not restrict the opera-
tion of section 409.415(c)() to offers to sell. Therefore, it is not
necessary to give the word "offer" appearing immediately before clause
(1) an objectionable split meaning.56
curities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 14(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)-(f) (1970). But it
is probable-though by no means certain-that the proviso to § 409.415(c) of the Mis-
souri Act should apply to offers that are lawful under the securities law of the state
to which they are directed, even if the offers are unlawful under a federal act. If this
view is correct, then the critical fault in the assertion that offers to buy, in themselves,
are rarely "unlawful" in any state is the possibility, in any of the three situations above,
that an unaccepted offer to buy does violate a state securities law.
In Kreis, the court of appeals accepted without question appellant's statement that of-
fers to buy are rarely illegal; the court found some support for its construction in this
"practical realit[y] of the market." 473 F.2d at 1312; see note 29 supra.
52. But see notes 54-55 infra and accompanying text.
53. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
54. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
55. See note 51 supra.
56. See text accompanying notes 38 & 53 supra.
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The language argument for interpreting "offer" in the proviso so as
to include both offers to buy and offers to sell thus withstands both pos-
sible counterarguments.5" If, however, an analysis of the purpose of
the proviso reveals sound policy reasons for limiting its application to
offers to sell, then the argument from the language of section
409.415(c) would have to be weighed carefully against those policy
reasons.
5 8
2. The Policy Argument
The policy argument for construing the proviso so as to include offers
to buy depends upon the validity of two propositions: first, that section
409.415(c)(2), together with other parts of section 409.415, provides
adequate protection to all Missouri residents; and secondly, that the
sole purpose of section 409.415(c)(l) must therefore be the prevention
of the use of Missouri as a base for fraudulent activities or for the sale
of doubtful securities to residents of other states." Although it is prob-
ably true that the only purpose behind section 409.415(c) (2) is the
protection of Missouri residents,60 it is doubtful that the protection
thereby provided was deemed "adequate" by the Missouri legislature61
or by the draftsmen of the Uniform Act,6 2 or that the sole purpose
served by section 409.415(c)(1) is the preventive purpose of the Act.a
57. Notes 49-56 supra and accompanying text.
Appellant in Kreis also contended that the terms "offeror" and "offeree," when used
in connection with a sale of securities, mean the issuer and prospective purchaser of se-
curities respectively, and that "an offer to an offeree can only mean an offer to sell
to a prospective buyer." Reply Brief for Appellant at 4. This contention borders on
the frivolous, because it disregards the occurrence of the phrase "offer to buy" through-
out 1 409.415, particularly in § 409.415(c). See note 21 supra. Whatever meaning the
term "offer" may usually have in securities contexts, its meaning in the proviso must
be determined by reference to the surrounding language and the purpose of the proviso.
58. See 2A StrrHERLAN § 47.08 (footnotes omitted):
Where there is doubt. . as to the extent of the restriction imposed by a pro-
viso on the scope of another provision's operation, the proviso is strictly con-
strued. The reason for this is that the legislative purpose set forth in the main
or dominant body of an enactment is assumed to express the legislative policy,
and only those subjects expressly exempted by the proviso should be freed
from the operation of the statute.
59. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
60. See notes 64-74 infra and accompanying text.
61. See notes 108-10 infra and accompanying text.
62. See text accompanying note 89 infra.
63. See notes 75-89 infra and accompanying text. For a definition of the preven-
tive purpose and a discussion of the policy of comity underlying it, see note 43 supra
and accompanying text.
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Determination of the purposes served by each part of section 409.415
(c) requires careful examination of the applicability of each part of
section 409.415 to four possible kinds of offers: (1) offers to sell
directed to Missouri; (2) offers to buy directed to Missouri; (3) offers
to sell originating from Missouri; and (4) offers to buy originating from
Missouri.
a. Purpose of Section 409.415(c)(2)
Section 409.415 (c) (2) of the Missouri Act provides that
an offer to sell or to buy is made in this state . . . when the offer
. . . is directed by the offeror to this state and received at the place
to which it is directed .... (4
Section 409.415(a) makes certain substantive provisions 8 of the Act
applicable "to persons who sell or offer to sell when 0) an offer to
sell is made in this state . ... (,6 Together, sections 409.415(a)(1)
and (c)(2) thus protect Missouri residents from sales that are made
fraudulently, or in violation of Missouri's registration requirements,"7
by out-of-state sellers who have solicited Missouri residents.
Further protection is afforded Missouri residents by the joint opera-
tion of sections 409.415(b)(1) and (c)(2). Section 409.415(b) makes
certain substantive provisions 8 of the Act applicable "to persons who
64. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 409.415(c) (1969) (emphasis added), quoted in note 21
supra.
65. The provisions applicable to sellers in the specified circumstances are § 409.101
(antifraud provision), § 409.201(a) (broker-dealer and agent registration requirement),
§ 409.301 (securities registration requirement), § 409.405 (prohibition of representa-
tions that registration of person or security, or availability of exception or exemption,
constitutes recommendation or approval by commissioner), and § 409.411 (civil liabil-
ities). See note 21 supra. See also notes 19 & 20 supra.
66. Mo. REv. STAT. § 409.415(a) (1969) (emphasis added), quoted in note 21
supra.
67. Both the broker-dealer or agent registration requirement, Mo. REv. STAT. §
409.201(a) (1969), and the securities registration requirement, id. § 409.301, must be
satisfied. See note 65 supra. If the seller comes within the statutory definition of
"broker-dealer," Mo. REv. STAT. § 409.401(c) (1969), or "agent," id. § 409.401(b),
then he must be registered in Missouri, regardless of whether the securities sold are "ex-
empt securities," id. § 409.402(a), or are sold in an "exempt transaction," id. §
409.402(b). If the securities and the transaction do not fall within one of the exemp-
tions, then the securities must also be registered.
68. The provisions applicable to buyers in the specified circumstances are §§
409.101, 409.201(a), and 409.405. See note 21 supra. For the content of these sec-
tions see note 65 supra. The Act imposes no civil liability upon persons who buy or
offer to buy in violation of these provisions. Loss & CowvTr 252 (Draftsmen's Coin-
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buy or offer to buy when (1) an offer to buy is made in this state
. . *"69 Taken together, sections 409.415(b)() and (c)(2) protect
Missouri residents from out-of-state buyers who solicit Missouri resi-
dents and then buy securities from the residents either fraudulently"
or in violation of Missouri's broker-dealer or agent registration require-
ment.
Section 409.415(c)(2) does not serve the secondary purpose of pre-
venting the use of Missouri as a base of fraudulent operations. Upon
first inspection, it may appear that the conjunction of sections 409.415
(a)(2)7 1 and (c)(2) would prevent unscrupulous sellers from using
Missouri as a base for victimizing residents of other states. Thus, if
an out-of-state resident directed an offer to buy to the Missouri seller,
the offer would be "made in" Missouri; and if the offer were "accepted
in" Missouri, then section 409.415(a)(2) would subject the seller to
the provisions of the Missouri Act. Similarly, it may appear that the
conjunction of sections 409.415(b)(2) 71 and (c)(2) would prevent
disreputable buyers from using Missouri as a base for victimizing out-
of-state residents. If a resident of another state directed an offer to
sell to the Missouri buyer, the offer would be "made in" Missouri; if,
in addition, the offer were "accepted in" Missouri, then under section
409.415(b)(2) the buyer would be subject to ithe provisions of the
Missouri Act.
mentary to U~wo u SEcuarrras Acr § 101); see UNIoFM SEcturrms Acr §§ 414(a)-
(f), Comment 10. The administrative, injunctive, and criminal sanctions of the Act,
however, are available against buyers who violate any of these provisions. UNIFORM
SEctrmEs AcT § 101, Comment; see Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 409.204(a) (2) (B), .409, .410
(1969); Loss & Cown-r 252 (Draftsmen's Commentary to UNIFORM SEcuRrTms Acr
§ 101).
69. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 409.415(b) (1969) (emphasis added), quoted in note 21
supra.
70. In discussions of fraud in securities transactions, it is customary to speak of
fraudulent sellers and defrauded buyers. The positions, however, may be reversed. See
Loss & CowETr 251-52 (Draftsmen's Commentary to UNoRM SEcUrrrs Acr § 101)
(emphasis original):
Although the blue sky laws were originally directed against fraudulent sellers,
experience at both state and federal levels has demonstrated that fraud is not
a one-way street. The stockholder who is persuaded to sell by a corporate in-
sider's bearish statements is defrauded no less than his brother who is per-
suaded to buy by a salesman's bullish statements.
The class of fraudulent buyers is, of course, not restricted to corporate insiders. See
3 Loss 1445 & n.l. Fraudulent tender offerors, for example, would also come under the
description.
71. Section 409.415(a)(2) is set out in text accompanying note 88 infra.
72. Section 409.415(b)(2) is set out in text accompanying note 85 infra.
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In neither of the above cases would the Missouri seller or buyer
come within the scope of the Missouri Act, because in neither case
would the out-of-state resident's offer to buy or sell be "accepted in"
Missouri. Section 409.415(d) provides, in effect, that an offer is
"accepted in" Missouri if the offeree directs his acceptance, or first
notification thereof, to the offeror in Missouri.73  In the above situa-
tions, the Missouri seller or buyer would be directing his acceptance,
or notification thereof, to the home state of the offeror, not to Missouri.
Therefore, the offers would not be "accepted in" Missouri, and the
Missouri Act would not apply to the transactions. 74
From the preceding analysis, it is clear that the only purpose served
by section 409.415(c)(2) is the protection of Missouri residents.
b. Purpose of Section 409.415(c)(1)
Section 409.415(c) of the Missouri Act provides that "an offer to sell
or to buy is made in this state. . . when the offer (1) originates from
this state . . . .,5 Together with section 409.415(a)(1),7 6 subsection
(c)() thus makes the substantive provisions" of the Act applicable
to Missouri sellers who direct offers to sell to persons in other states.
The purpose served by the joint operation of sections (a)(1) and
(c)(1) is the prevention of the use of Missouri as a base of operations
by dishonest sellers.
The conjunction of sections 409.415(b)(0)78 and (c)(0) also furthers
the preventive purpose of the Act. Those two sections make certain
73. For an analysis of § 409.415(d) of the Missouri Act and the constructional
problems raised by it, see notes 122-62 infra and accompanying text.
74. This result is consonant with the rationale behind the secondary, or preventive,
purpose of the Act. See note 43 supra and accompanying text. The regulating state
desires only to prevent its use as a base for the victimization of residents of other states.
Persons who wish to use the regulating state for this purpose will have to solicit residents
of other states. If they do, then they will come within the scope of the regulating state's
act by means of other scope-of-act provisions. See notes 75-80 infra and accompanying
text. The situations posited in text both involve unsolicited offers, either to buy or to
sell, from nonresidents of Missouri. These situations are atypical of the type of trans-
action in which a nonresident would be "victimized" by an unscrupulous buyer or seller
based in Missouri.
75. Mo. REv. STAT. § 409.415(c) (1969) (emphasis added), quoted in note 21
supra.
76. For the relevant language of § 409.415(a)(1), see text accompanying note 66
supra.
77. See note 65 supra.
78. For the relevant language of § 409.415(b)(1), see text accompanying note 69
supra.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss3/2
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substantive provisions 9 of the Act applicable to Missouri buyers who
direct offers to buy to nonresidents of Missouri. The purpose thus
served is the prevention of the use of Missouri as a base of operations
by dishonest buyers.80
Unlike section 409.415(c) (2),1 however, section 409.415(c) (1)
serves an important second function, necessitated by section 409.415
(e)."2 Under section 409.415(e), the circulation in Missouri of a
national newspaper or magazine containing an advertisement for the
sale or purchase of a security, or the reception in Missouri of a radio
or television program originating outside Missouri and including a
similar commercial, does not constitute an offer to sell or to buy "made
in" Missouri. Section 409.415(e) thus creates an exception to section
409.415(c) (2) ;83 certain kinds of offers that are directed to Missouri,
and would otherwise be "made in" Missouri under section 409.415(c)
(2), are not "made in" Missouri because of section 409.415(e).
The effect of section 409.415(e) is to enable out-of-state sellers or
buyers to solicit Missouri residents without coming under the scope of
the Missouri Act. The second purpose served by section 409.415(c)
(1) is to close this gap in the protection of Missouri residents. Section
409.415(b)(2) makes the substantive provisions84 of the Act applicable
"to persons who buy or offer to buy when. . . an offer to sell is made
and accepted in this state." 5  Section 409.415(d) provides in effect
that an offer to buy or to seli is "accepted in this state" when the offeree
directs the acceptance or first notification thereof to the offeror in
Missouri.88 If a Missouri resident saw an advertisement to buy,
inserted by a nonresident buyer in a national magazine or newspaper,
and if the resident responded by sending an offer to sell to the prospec-
tive buyer, then the offer to sell would be "made in" Missouri under
section 409.415(c)(1) (disregarding, for the moment, the proviso). If
79. See note 68 supra.
80. See note 70 supra.
81. See notes 71-74 supra and accompanying text.
82. For the text of § 409.415(e), see note 27 supra.
83. Section 409.415(e) qual'fies § 409.415(c)(2), not § 409.415(c)(1). This is
made clear by the phrasing of § (e) in terms of circulation of the newspaper or mag-
azine "in this state," or reception of the radio or television program "in this state." See
note 27 supra.
84. See note 68 supra.
85. Mo. REv. STAT. § 409.415(b) (1969) (emphasis added), quoted in note 21
supra.
86. See notes 122-62 infra and accompanying text.
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the buyer then accepts the offer to sell by directing the acceptance,
or first notification thereof, to the offeror in Missouri, the offer to sell
would be "accepted in" Missouri under section 409.415(d). The con-
junction of sections 409.415(b)(2), (c)0), and (d) thus would pro-
vide Missouri residents protection against out-of-state buyers who, by
means of section 409.415(e), avoid being covered by the Act under
sections 409.415(b)Q) and (c)(2).
Section 409.415(c)(1), in conjunction with subsections (a)(2) and
(d), would (but for the proviso) provide similar protection to Missouri
residents against out-of-state sellers who, by means of section 409.415
(e), avoid being covered by sections 409.415(a)(1) and (c)(2) of the
Missouri Act. Section 409.415(a) (2) makes the substantive provi-
sions17 of the Act applicable "to persons who sell or offer to sell when
. . . an offer to buy is made and accepted in this state.""" If a Missouri
resident saw an advertisement inserted by an out-of-state seller in a
national magazine or newspaper, and if the resident sent an offer to
buy to the seller, then under section 409.415(c) (1) (disregarding, for
the moment, the proviso) the offer to buy would be "made in"
Missouri. Under section 409.415(d), if the offeree directs his accept-
ance, or first notification thereof, to the offeror in Missouri, then the
offer to buy is "accepted in" Missouri, and the seller comes under the
coverage of the Act.
The draftsmen of the Uniform Act clearly intended that section 414
(c)(1) (section 409,415(c)(1) of the Missouri Act) provide protection
to residents of -an adopting state who respond to offers covered under
section 414(e) (section 409.415(e) of the Missouri Act). Official
Comment 7 to section 414 of the Uniform Act states:
The door left open in § 414(e) is then closed somewhat by §
414(a)(2), which provides in effect that a person in State B who
makes an offer to buy as a result of an advertisement he sees in a paper
published in State S (or a radio or television program originating in
State S) may render -the statute [of State B] 'applicable if the seller
then accepts the offer "in this state" (that is, State B). And § 414(d)
specifies when an offer is "accepted in this state."89
The draftsmen of the Uniform Act must have intended that section 414
87. See note 65 supra,
88. Mo. REv. STAT. § 409.415(a) (1969) (emphasis added), quoted in note 21
supra
89. UNiFORM SEcurrrns Acr §§ 414(a)-(f), Comment 7 (emphasis original).
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(c)(1) apply to the offer to buy from the resident of State B, because
otherwise the statute of State B would not apply in this situation.
c. Purpose of the Proviso
The preceding analysis demonstrates that the purpose of section
409.415(c)(1) of the Missouri Act (as deduced from the possible
applications of the language of the section, except for the proviso), as
well as the purpose of the parallel section in the Uniform Act (as indi-
cated in the Official Comment), encompasses the protection of Mis-
souri residents. Application of the proviso to offers to sell or to buy-
as the language of section 409.415(c) seems to require 90-would deny
the protection of the Missouri Act to Missouri residents who buy or sell
securities in response to advertisements by nonresidents in national
publications.9' Whether the Missouri General Assembly intended92
90. See notes 36-41, 48-58 supra and accompanying text.
91. See notes 81-89 supra and accompanying text. This denial of protection results
because in the situations where § 409.415(c)(1) serves a protective purpose, it is the
nonresident who accepts the offer who is possibly violating the Missouri Act. The Mis-
souri resident who makes the offer is, presumably, not violating another state's law, and
therefore the proviso excludes his offer from the class of offers "made in this state."
Strangely enough, if the Missouri resident does in fact violate the law of another state
by making his offer, then the offer is not covered by the proviso and would be "made
in this state." Consequently, the nonresident who "accepts" the offer "in this state,"
as defined in § 409.415(d), is subject to the substantive provisions of the Act; if he
violates any of the provisions and is sued by the Missouri resident, he must argue that
the Missouri resident is in pad delicto and estopped from recovering. This defense,
however, is not expressly made available by the Act. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 409.411
(1969). In short, a Missouri resident who directs an offer to buy or to sell to a non-
resident, and whose offer is "accepted in Missouri," seems to be in a better position
under the Act-at least as far as the nonresident's possible civil liability is concerned-
if the offer is unlawful in the state to which it is directed, than if the offer is lawful
there!
92. The main difference between the "intent" and "meaning" approaches to statu-
tory construction lies in the weight to be given to various constructional aids. Under
the "intent" approach, more particularized attention is given to legislative history, and
less importance is attached to the "conventional or dictionary meanings" of words or
to maxims of interpretation, than under the "meaning" approach. 2A SumTERLAN §
45.08.
Because the rule of construction enunciated by the Missouri Supreme Court is a hy-
brid of the "intent" and "meaning" approaches, see note 31 supra, serious problems in
determining the relevance and probative force of different kinds of constructional aids
could, theoretically, arise under the Missouri rule. In practice, however, the rule causes
few problems because of the lack of legislative history materials on Missouri statutes.
The Journal of the General Assembly contains only a procedural record of the motions
and votes in the two houses; no committee reports or transcripts of debate or discussion
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this result must be determined from analysis of the purpose of the
proviso.
Although the Missouri legislature may have specifically intended that
the proviso limit the protection given Missouri residents by section
409.415(c)(1), it seems more likely that the proviso was meant to serve
a different purpose.93 Under sections 414(a) (1), (b) (1), and (c) (1)
are included. Indeed, in formulating the Missouri constructional rule in terms of two
different approaches, the Missouri Court may have been influenced by an awareness of
the unavailability of legislative history. The rule seems to express primarily an empha-
sis on the legislative intent, and secondarily a recognition that this "intent" can usually
be found only in the words of a statute. See note 31 supra. Therefore, the discussion
in this Note will assume that the standard for construing a Missouri statute is the intent
of the Missouri legislature. For a discussion of the concept of legislative "intent," see
2A SUTHERLAND § 45.05-.06.
93. The General Assembly may have intended to limit the scope of protection under
the Act for three possible reasons. First, in situations where a Missouri resident would
be protected by § 409.415(c)(1), the federal securities laws would be applicable; the
Missouri legislature may have felt that the protection of the federal laws was adequate.
Secondly, the class of Missouri residents who would be protected by § 409.415(c)(1),
but not by § 409.415(c) (2), may be small. Thirdly, the legislature may have believed
that residents protected only by § 409.415(c) (1) would be either "welshers" or knowl-
edgeable, sophisticated investors who would not deserve or require the protection of the
Missouri Act. See Mills Letter, supra note 41.
None of these reasons seems adequate to justify restricting the coverage of the Act.
In the first place, the Missouri Act protects many persons who also enjoy the protection
of the federal securities laws. For example, Missouri residents who buy or sell securities
in response to solicitations by nonresident sellers or buyers are protected under §
409.415 (c) (2) of the Missouri Act, see notes 64-70 supra and accompanying text, even
though the federal laws are also applicable. There appears no reason why Missouri res-
idents who buy or sell in response to advertisements in national publications should be
treated differently and denied the protection of the Missouri Act.
The validity of the second reason is also doubtful. Nonresident sellers can phrase
advertisements in national publications in such a way as to impress upon readers the
necessity that prospective buyers enclose payment with their orders. Similarly, nonresi-
dent buyers-e.g., tender offerors-can specify in their advertisements that the certifi-
cates representing the securities to be sold must be mailed to them along with the offers
to sell. See note 170 infra. In either case, the nonresident could "close the deal" with-
out directing to Missouri any further correspondence that would be an offer "made in
Missouri" under § 409.415(c) (2). The number of Missouri residents who may respond
to such advertisements in the specified manner is probably significant.
Finally, the third possible rationale for limiting the protection provided by the Act
is unsound. Although many persons protected by § 409.415(c)(1) may be "welshers"
in the sense that they wish to back out of unsound investments, the same is true of per-
sons protected by § 409.415(c)(2). Indeed, it can be argued that one purpose of civil
liabilities provisions in state securities laws is to permit a buyer to speculate at the ex-
pense of the seller if the seller has not complied with the provisions of the laws. Cf.
3 Loss 1677-78. While it is true that regular readers of national financial magazines
or newspapers are likely to be more knowledgeable about investment matters than the
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of the Uniform Securities Act, a resident of a state that has adopted
the Act is subject to the substantive provisions of the Act if he directs
an offer to sell or to buy to a resident of another state, regardless of
whether the offer, or any sale or purchase resulting from it, is unlawful
in the other state. Offerees in other states may thus receive more pro-
tection from the Act of the offeror's state than they do from the acts
of their own states. This result cannot be explained in terms of the
protective purpose of the Act, because most states are not directly inter-
ested in protecting residents of other states. Rather, the result must
be in furtherance of the preventive purpose of the Act and the under-
lying policy of comity.94
The method by which the Uniform Act implements the policy of
comity can best be examined in the following context. Assume that
state A has adopted the Uniform Act in toto. The residents of A re-
ceive full protection under the Act only if they are as secure in their
transactions with residents of state B as they are in transactions with
other residents of A. To this end, section 414 of A's Act makes the
substantive provisions of the Act applicable to residents of B who en-
gage in certain kinds of transactions with residents of A. 95 From the
viewpoint of state A, however, the ideal situation would be sufficiently
average Missouri resident, § 409.415(e) also applies to advertisements in general news-
magazines or newspapers of national circulation, and commercials on radio or television
programs originating outside Missouri. The audience for this second group of publica-
tions will doubtless include many persons of average, or less-than-average, financial abil-
ity. Furthermore, the likelihood that a Missouri resident will respond to such an adver-
tisement in a way that enables the nonresident advertiser to "close the deal" without
further communication with the Missouri resident seems just as much a function of gul-
libility as of financial sophistication. Therefore, the class of residents who would be
protected under § 409.415(c) (1) but not under § 409.415(c) (2) will probably include
many of the persons who are most in need of the protection of the Act.
Since the possible reasons for limiting the protection provided by § 409.415(c)(1)
are all questionable, it appears likely that the Missouri General Assembly added the pro-
viso to f 409.415(c) for another purpose. See also text accompanying note 107 infra.
94. See note 43 supra.
95. See notes 64-70, 81-89 supra and accompanying text.
Under the Act of state A, any nonresident who engages in conduct prohibited or made
actionable by the Act, who has not filed a consent to service of process in connection
with an application for registration, and over whom personal jurisdiction cannot other-
wise be obtained would be deemed to have appointed the Administrator as his agent for
receipt of process "in any non-criminal suit, action, or proceeding against him . . .
which grows out of that conduct. . . ." UNIFORM SE CRIT s ACT § 414(h). A res-
ident of state A is thus furnished a convenient forum for recovery against a resident
of state B who has defrauded him or sold him securities in violation of state A's regis-
tration requirements.
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stringent administrative enforcement of the statute of state B to ensure
that only honest and reputable persons engage in the securities business
in state B. In this ideal situation, the number of cases in which a resi-
dent of A would have to resort to the provisions of section 414 in order
to recover against a resident of B would be minimized, because "honest
and reputable" dealers in state B would presumably comply with the
law of state A before engaging in interstate transactions with residents
of A. 9G
In order to encourage state B to administer its act strictly-and, in
particular, to encourage state B to provide the full protection of its act
to residents of A who engage in interstate transactions with residents
of B-state A undertakes to provide the full protection of its Act to
residents of B who engage in interstate transactions with residents of
A. State A fully realizes that, in some circumstances, it will be pro-
tecting residents of B who would be unprotected under the law of their
own state. But state A anticipates that, in other circumstances, as a
result of A's pursuit of its policy of comity, B will provide protection
to residents of A who would not be fully protected under A's law. 7
96. Cf. text accompanying note 156 infra.
97. A resident of state A may receive two kinds of additional protection from strict
enforcement of the law of state B. First, conduct that is lawful in A may be proscribed
in B (e.g., the offer or sale of an unregistered security that is exempt from registration
in A, but not exempt in B). A buyer in A may thus be able to recover against a seller
in B under B's law, but not under A's. The decision by the legislature of A not to pro-
scribe the conduct in question does not necessarily reflect a legislative determination
that the residents of A would derive no protection from the proscription. Rather, the
legislature may have felt that the administrative and other costs of prohibiting the con.
duct would exceed any benefit to the residents of A. If state B has made a contrary
finding and does proscribe the conduct, then state A would presumably want state B
to furnish the full protection of its law to residents of A who engage in interstate trans-
actions with residents of B.
Secondly, it may prove difficult, if not impossible, to apply the administrative and
criminal sanctions of A's Act to violators of the Act who make B their base of opera-
tions. The residents of A will be fully protected from such operators only if the en-
forcement of B's law is sufficiently vigorous to keep the operators out of business. Of
course, state B cannot administratively enforce the antifraud provisions and registration
requirements of state A's Act. But if B makes its own act applicable to interstate trans-
actions between its residents and residents of A, and if B strictly enforces the substantive
provisions of its act, then many potential swindlers of A's residents will be kept out of
business in B. . See text accompanying note 96 supra.
I Even if B's law does not seem to provide as complete protection as A's (e.g., if B
does not register securities), A's residents would still derive the second kind of addi-
tional protection from strict enforcement of B's law. Furthermore, state A would have
an.additional reason for providing the full protection of its* Act to residents of B who
engage in interstate transactions with residents of A. Some residentS of B would enjoy
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The ultimate objective of state A is thus the maximum possible protec-
tion of its own residents.98
There is persuasive evidence that the Missouri legislature intended
to modify the way in which the scope-of-act provisions of the Uniform
Act implement this policy of comity. In an article published shortly
after passage of the Missouri Act, a member and the chairman of the
committee that drafted the Act stated that the proviso to section
409.415(c) was added to preclude a violation of the Act by a Missouri
broker who offered to sell a nonresident a security that was registered
in the nonresident's state but unregistered in Missouri.99 Logically, the
same policy should apply if the nonresident's state has no securities
registration requirement, 00 or if the Missouri broker-dealer has satis-
fied the broker-dealer registration requirements in the nonresident's
state but not in Missouri,'' or if the Missouri broker's offer violates
the antifraud provision of Missouri but not of the nonresident's state.'0 2
the protection of A's Act, whereas other residents of B (those who engage in intrastate
transactions) would not be so protected. This disparity in the protection available to
its own citizens may induce the legislature of B to supplement its law (e.g., by adding
a securities registration requirement). If B makes the protection of its law available
to residents of A who engage in interstate transactions with residents of B, then the
supplement in protection under B's act would redound to the benefit of residents of A.
98. See notes 43 & 97 supra.
99. Mills & Jensen, supra note 29, at 68; see note 29 supra. For a discussion of
the weight to be given to draftsmen's views in construing a statute, see 2A SUrHMRLAND
§ 48.12. With regard to the Missouri Act, there is the additional question of whether
the "draftsmen" of the Act were the draftsmen of the Uniform Securities Act or the
members of the committee that adapted the Uniform Act to Missouri's needs. When the
section being construed is a proviso that was added to the Uniform Act by the state
legislature, it is probably sound to regard the members of the state committee as the
"draftsmen" of the section.
100. Only four states do not require the registration of securities. See note 6 supra.
101. In practice, this situation seems unlikely to arise. A broker from a state other
than Missouri may happen to be in Missouri (e.g., on vacation) when he directs an offer
to his home state. But in that event, if the broker does not direct more than fifteen
offers to sell or to buy to noninstitutional Missouri investors during any twelve-month
period, he would be excepted from the definition of "broker-dealer" by Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 409.401(c)(4)(B) (1969). The situation in text would arise only if a person with
a place of business in Missouri confined his securities business to residents of another
state in which he was registered.
Every state requires the registration of broker-dealers and agents, 1 Loss 43, 47, but
variations between states in the definitions of these terms, in the standards for denial,
suspension, or revocation of registration, and in the strictness of administration, see gen-
erally Loss & Cow=TT 43-86, make it likely that a person who can satisfy the require-
ments in one state may not be able to do so in another.
102. The slight variations between states in the antifraud provisions, see note 51
supra, make this situation possible, though unlikely.
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By restricting the protection given nonresidents under the Missouri
Act to situations in which the nonresidents would be protected under
the acts of their own states, the Missouri legislature implicitly encour-
aged other states to protect Missourians only in situations where the
Missourians would be protected under the Missouri Act. The proviso
to section 409.415(c) thus reflects a less ambitious pursuit of the policy
of comity than that envisioned by the draftsmen of the Uniform Act.10 3
There is, however, no evidence that the Missouri legislature intended
the proviso to limit the protection afforded Missouri residents by the
conjunction of section 409.415(c)(1) and sections 409.415(a)(2) and
(b) (2). 104 Rather it seems likely that the limitation of the protection
provided to Missouri residents by those sections was an unintended
consequence of the proviso.
d. Construction of the Proviso
If the constructional issue raised by the proviso in Kreis had been
whether to give the word "offer" the meaning required by the language
of section 409.415(c), 0 5 despite the probably unintended conse-
quences of this meaning, the court would have had no choice but to
follow the plain language of the section. This is especially true since
full achievement of the purpose of the proviso requires application of
the proviso to both offers to sell and offers to buy,'00 and since there
are possible policy reasons for tolerating the resulting limitation of pro-
tection to Missouri residents. 02 Other considerations, however, sup-
port the Kreis court's restrictive reading of the proviso.
The policy discussed in text also requires that a Missouri buyer be exempted from
the provisions of the Missouri Act if his offer to buy is lawful in the state to which
it is directed but unlawful in Missouri, whether because of different broker-dealer regis-
tration requirements, see note 101 supra, or different antifraud provisions, see note 51
supra, in the laws of the two states.
103. Because of the proviso to § 409.415(c), Missouri could not expect another
state-for example, Illinois-to extend the protection of its law to a Missouri resident
who engages in an interstate transaction with an Illinois resident, if the Missouri resi-
dent would not be protected under the Missouri Act. The Missouri legislature therefore
must have reconciled itself to less than the maximum possible protection of Missouri
residents. See notes 97-98 supra and accompanying text.
104. See generally notes 81-89 supra and accompanying text.
105. See notes 36-41, 48-58 supra and accompanying text.
106. Presumably, the Missouri legislature desired to restrict the protection given by
the Act to nonresidents who either buy from, or sell to, Missouri residents, See note
102 supra.
107. S¢c note 93 supra,
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When the Missouri legislature adopted the Uniform Act, sections 414
(a)(2) and (b)(2) of the Act were enacted without modification.
The sole purpose served by those two sections is the extension of the
Act's protection to Missouri residents who buy securities from, or sell
securities to, a nonresident who has not "made in" Missouri an offer
to sell or to buy.10 8 Application of the proviso to offers to sell would
totally deprive section 409.415(b) (2) of operative effect.10 9 Applica-
tion of the proviso to offers to buy would have the same effect on sec-
tion 409.415(a)(2)." °
It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that no part of a statute
should be so construed as to render inoperative any other part of the
statute, unless that result cannot be avoided."' Only one possible con-
struction of the word "offer" in the proviso would preserve the opera-
tive effect of sections 409.415(a)(2) and (b)(2) and simultaneously
accomplish the purpose of the proviso: "offer" would have to encom-
pass both offers to buy and offers to sell when either section 409.415
(a)(1) or (b)(1) was being applied, but "offer" could include neither
offers to buy nor offers to sell when section 409.415(a)(2) or (b)(2)
was being applied. This "construction," however, amounts to a virtual
redraft of the proviso; 1 2 no court could be expected to give the same
word a broad meaning in one set of circumstances, and no meaning
at all in another. The question therefore becomes how to construe the
proviso so as to give the greatest effect to the intent of the Missouri
legislature.
The Kreis court's construction of the proviso renders section 409.415
(b)(2) inoperative," 13 and thus denies some Missouri residents the
protection of the Act. The persons thus denied protection, however,
are residents who sell a security to a nonresident, probably in response
to an advertisement in a national publication." 4 Even if these persons
were "protected" under the Act, they would not be able to bring an
108. See notes 84-89 supra and accompanying text.
109. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
110. See id.
111. 2A SUTHERLAND §§ 46.05-.06; see State ex rel. Wright v. Carter, 319 S.W.2d
596, 600 (Mo. 1958); Welborn v. Southern Equip. Co., 386 S.W.2d 432, 436 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1964), affd in part and rev'd in part, 395 S.W.2d 119 (Mo. 1965).
112. For a proposed redraft of the proviso that would achieve the purpose of the pro-
viso without limiting the protection given Missouri residents under the Act, see text pre-
ceding note 166 inIra.
113. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
114. See text following note 86 supra.
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action for rescission; their "protection" would be limited to administra-
five, injunctive, or criminal actions brought by the Commissioner
against the nonresident buyer." 5 On the other hand, the Kreis court's
construction does effect the legislative intent to restrict the protection
given to nonresident buyers under the Act. Since only buyers can
bring an action for rescission under the Act,"0 it is likely that the Mis-
souri legislature was most concerned with limiting the protection that
nonresident buyers would receive under the Act." 7
Application of the proviso to offers to buy as well as offers to sell
would more fully effect the purpose of the proviso than does the Kreis
court's construction, by limiting the protection provided nonresident
sellers under the Act. The Missouri legislature, however, was probably
concerned less with limiting the protection given nonresident sellers
than with limiting the protection given nonresident buyers, because
sellers would not be able to bring actions for rescission under the Act,
even if they were "protected."" 8  On the other hand, the application
of the proviso to offers to buy would deny the protection of the Act
to Missouri residents who, like Kreis, would otherwise be protected by
the conjunction of sections 409.415(a)(2), (c)(), and (d).
There is no sure measure of the relative importance that the Missouri
legislature attached, on the one hand, -to the protective purpose served
by sections 409.415(a) (2) and (b) (2) and, on the other hand, to the
restriction of the policy of comity achieved by the proviso. Since the
protection of Missouri residents is presumably the primary," 01 and ulti-
mate,' 20 objective of the Missouri Act, it seems reasonable to assume
that the Missouri legislature considered the protective purpose served
by sections 409.415(a)(2) and (b)(2) at least as important as the pro-
viso's restriction of the policy of comity. If this assessment is accurate,
then the limitation of the proviso to offers to sell is defensible on the
ground that that construction best balances the different legislative
intents of sections 409.415(a)(2) and (b)(2) on the one hand, and
the proviso to section 409.415(c) on the other. Despite the argument
based on the language of section 409.415(c) for including both offers
115. See note 68 supra.
116. See id.
117. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
118. See note 68 supra.
119. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
120. See notes 43 & 98 supra and accompanying text.
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to sell and offers to buy within the meaning of "offer" in the proviso,' 21
the Kreis court's construction of "offer" as including only offers to sell
was probably correct.
it. CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 409.415 (D)
OF THE MISSOURI ACT
A. Objections to the Kreis Court's Construction
Assuming that the Kreis court reached the proper construction of the
proviso to section 409.415(c), 22 the dispositive issue in the case was
whether Kreis' offer to buy was "accepted in Missouri," within the
meaning of section 409.415(d). More broadly stated, the issue was
whether it was the intent of the Missouri legislature, as expressed in
the words of the Act, 123 for a unilateral contract like that between KIeis
and the Fund'24 to fall within the scope of the Act. Section 409.301
of the Missouri Act makes it unlawful "for any person to offer or sell
any security" in Missouri, unless the security is registered or exempt,
or the transaction is exempt.'12 5  The broad definition of "sell" in
section 409.401(j)() 126 would appear to bring the Fund's "disposition"
of its shares to Kreis clearly within the scope of section 409.301. In
that case, the Fund would be liable to Kreis under section 409.411,
which imposes civil liability upon anyone who, inter alia, "sells a
security in violation of section. . . 409.301 .... ,,127
The difficulties in Kreis arose under section 409.415, which purports
to define specifically the applicability of sections 409.301 and 409.411.
121. See notes 36-41, 48-58 supra and accompanying text.
122. See notes 105-21 supra and accompanying text.
123. See note 92 supra.
124. The district court in Kreis determined that common law acceptance of Kxeis'
offer had been effected by the Fund's posting of the sale and issuance of shares, and
by the depositing of Kreis' check, all of which occurred in New York. 335 F. Supp.
at 1304-05; see text accompanying note 17 supra. Since § 409.415(d) of the Missouri
Act defines "acceptance in this state" in terms of "acceptance," and since the Act pro-
vides no special definition of "acceptance," the district court concluded that the word
"acceptance," standing alone, retains its common law meaning. 335 F. Supp. at 1305;
see text accompanying notes 143-46 infra. The district court therefore held that
the offer to buy had not been "accepted in Missouri." 335 F. Supp. at 1305.
The court of appeals refused to decide whether common law acceptance had been ef-
fected by the Fund's performance in New York, on the ground that this question was
irrelevant to a determination of the applicability of § 409.415(d). 473 F.2d at 1312-
13.
125. See note 19 supra.
126. See note 5 supra.
127. See note 20 supra.
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Section 409.415(a)(2) defines that applicability as attaching whenever
"an offer to buy is made and accepted in this state.' 2  If "accepted"
is used here in its common law sense, then a unilateral contract of the
Kreis-Mates kind is definitely excluded from the scope of the Act, and
the broad scope seemingly indicated by the general terms of section
409.301 would be limited by the specific terms of section 409.415. a12
However, section 409.415(d), which defines "acceptance in this state,"
seems to prescribe a meaning for "accepted" in section 409.415(a)(2),
other than the common law meaning.
In construing section 409.415(d), the Kreis court looked to the
"plain language" of the section.' s0 The court emphasized that subsec-
tion (d) defines acceptance in this state, only for the purpose of section
409.415, and that the definition "turns upon communication"'' of
acceptance. By lifting these words out of their statutory context, the
court of appeals was able to gloss over a serious ambiguity in
subsection (d).
A careful reading of section 409.415(d) 132 suggests at least two
equally reasonable interpretations of the "meaning" of the section: (1)
an offer is "accepted in Missouri" if the offeree directs to the offeror in
Missouri either the actual common law acceptance or original notifica-
tion of the offeree's prior common law acceptance, and the acceptance or
the notification thereof is received in Missouri; or (2) an offer is
"accepted in Missouri" if the offeree directs to the offeror in Missouri
the actual common law acceptance of the offer, and the acceptance is
received in Missouri. 3 3 The first construction of subsection (d) would
128. See note 21 supra.
129. It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that "[w]here there is in-
escapable conflict between general terms or provisions of a statute and other terms or
provisions therein of a specific nature, the specific will prevail and be given effect over
the general." 2A SUTHERLAND § 46.05, at 57 (footnote omitted).
130. 473 F.2d at 1312; see text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
131. 473 F.2d at 1312 (emphasis added).
132. See note 21 supra.
133. The first of these interpretations is suggested by an application of the dictionary
definition of "communicate," see note 30 supra, to the text of § 409.415(d) up until
the semicolon in the section. The text of the section after the semicolon, however,
seems to support the second interpretation because of the recurrence of the term "it,"
the antecedent of which can only be "acceptance." See note 21 supra, quoting Mo. REv.
STAT. § 409.415(d) (1969) (emphasis added). The problem of assigning an antecedent
to the pronoun "it" appeared clearly in the following sentence from the opinion of the
court: "Substantially, an offer is accepted here in Missouri when it is 'communicated
to the offeror in this state'. . . ." 473 F.2d at 1312 (emphasis added). Certainly the
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extend the coverage of the Act to unilateral contracts, because the
offeree in such a contract must give notice of acceptance within a rea-
sonable time after accepting."' The second possible construction of
subsection (d), however, would equate "acceptance in this state" with
the offeree's directing to the offeror in Missouri a communication which
is itself the acceptance (in the common law sense) of the offer. This
construction would exclude from the scope of the Act unilateral con-
tracts created through the offeree's performance of the requested act
in a state other than Missouri.
135
The Kreis court would seem to have had the option of adopting
either of the suggested constructions of section 409.415(d). The first
construction would require the court to admit that there was a failure
in the drafting of subsection (d),13 6 but would make the scope of the
Act as specifically defined in section 409.415 nearly co-extensive with
the scope as indicated in the general sections 409.301 and 409.411.131
The second construction, while requiring no admission of a failure in
drafting subsection (d), would seriously restrict the scope of the Act
indicated in the general provisions, by attributing a common law
meaning to "acceptance" in section 409.415.138
The Kreis court's failure to discuss the ambiguity in section 409.415
(d) weakens the precedential value of the court's construction of that
section. Although the court justifiably sought the "plain meaning" of
the section,' 39 the scope of its search for this meaning was unnecessarily
restricted. 14 0  Even strict adherence to the plain meaning rule should
not prevent a court from referring to parts of a statute other than the
court cannot be talking about communication of an offer; but just as certainly, the word
"it" in the quoted sentence must refer to "offer."
134. See RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcTs § 56 (1932); cf. 1 A. CoRmN, CONTRACTS
1 67 (1963, Supp. 1971).
135. This second construction of § 409.415(d) would, however, differ from the com-
mon law rule for determining the place of acceptance in bilateral contracts. Normally
when an offeree accepts by letter, telephone, or telegram, the place of acceptance is the
place where the letter is mailed, the words of acceptance are spoken, or the telegram
is sent. See I A. CoRnN, supra note 134, §§ 78-81.
136. Specifically, the suggested drafting failure in § 409.415(d) is the use of the
word "it," and its reference back to "acceptance," in the part of the section following
the semicolon. See notes 21 & 133 supra.
137. See text accompanying notes 124-29 supra.
138. See text accompanying note 129 supra.
139. See notes 31 & 92 supra.
140. The court limited its inquiry into the meaning of § 409.415(d) to the words
of that section alone. See text accompanying notes 30-32, 130-31 supra.
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section being construed in order to resolve an ambiguity in that sec-
tion.141 A more thorough analysis of the meaning of section 409.415
(d), however, probably would have led to the same construction as in
Kreis.
B. Additional Support for the Construction in Kreis
Several considerations seem to indicate that the first suggested con-
struotion of section 409.415(d) 4 2 is more consistent with the legislative
intent than is the second suggested construction. First, as the court
of appeals observed, "[c]ommon law contract concepts, where sup-
planted by the Act, obviously no longer control in the applicable
areas." -' 43 This observation alone does not take us far, because the
question remains whether subsection (d) was meant to "supplant" the
common law concept of acceptance. Certainly the use of the term
"acceptance" in the definition of "acceptance in this state" in subsec-
tion (d) does not indicate an intent to supplant the prior, common law
meaning of "acceptance."' 44  Nevertheless, some force is given to the
court's observation by the apparent incompatibility between the pur-
pose of section 409.415-namely, the introduction of "order and
predictability" into determinations of the scope of the Act' 45-and the
"complexities and subtleties" involved in the common law notion of
'acceptance.146
Secondly, the second suggested construction of section 409.415(d)
would tend to produce "unreasonable" results. For example, suppose
that a Missouri broker called a customer in another state and offered
to sell that customer a security not registered under the law of Missouri
or the other state. Further assume that the customer purchased the
security under circumstances that would have made the customer's state
the common law locus of the purchase. Under sections 409.415(a) and
(c), the Missouri Act would be applicable because the broker's offer
to sell was "made in Missouri." The out-of-state purchaser could
therefore rescind under section 409.411 of the Missouri Act. It would
be unreasonable to assume that the Missouri General Assembly, in pur-
141. See 2A SUTIME AND §§ 46.05, 47.02.
142. See text following note 132 supra.
143. 473 F.2d at 1311.
144. See note 124 supra.
145. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
146. 473 F.2d at 1311, 1312, 1313.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss3/2
INTERSTATE SCOPE
suit of a policy of comity,147 intended to afford greater protection to
an out-of-state buyer against a Missouri broker, than to a Missouri
buyer (like Kreis) against an out-of-state seller (like the Fund).148
Since "the law favors a construction which harmonizes with reason and
which tends to avoid . . . unreasonable results,"1 49 there is sound
reason for preferring, as a matter of reasonable construction, the first
suggested interpretation of section 409.415(d).
Thirdly, the second proposed construction of section 409.415(d)
would lead to an unreasonable result in another way. Assume that the
Fund had mailed Kreis a letter of acceptance before depositing Kreis'
check and before posting the sale and issuance of shares to Kreis on
its books. In that event, the second construction of subsection (d)
would make the Act applicable to the transaction. On the facts of the
actual case, however, the second construction would make the Act in-
applicable to the sale, because it was not the common law acceptance
of Kreis' offer that the Fund directed to him in Missouri. The mere
reversal of the time sequence of the Fund's actions in response to Kreis'
letter would not justify the difference in coverage under the Act that
the second construction of subsection (d) would produce. The
unreasonableness of this result provides another reason for preferring
the first construction of subsection (d).
Fourthly, adoption of the second construction of section 409.415(d)
would seem to produce a result at variance with the public policy
behind the Missouri Act. That policy, broadly described, is the pro-
tection of investors in securities by means of, inter alia, a comprehen-
sive system of registration of all securities sold or offered in the state,
except for certain exempt securities or securities sold in certain exempt
transactions. 150 If out-of-state sellers of securities placed advertise-
ments in national publications, 15' being sure to impress upon readers
147. See notes 43, 94-104 supra and accompanying text.
148. This assumption would be especially unreasonable in view of the Missouri legis-
lature's desire, manifested by the addition of the proviso to § 409.415(c), to limit the
situations in which the policy of comity would be pursued. See note 103 supra and ac-
companying text.
The argument in text also provides support for the Kreis court's construction of the
proviso to § 409.415(c). Cf. notes 105-21 supra and accompanying text.
149. In re Jackson, 268 F. Supp. 434, 441 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd sub nom. Zuke v.
Mercantile Trust Co. Nat'l Ass'n, 385 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1967); accord, Laclede Gas
Co. v. City of St. Louis, 363 Mo. 842, 848, 253 S.W.2d 832, 835 (1953).
150. See cases cited note 42 supra.
151. Section 409.415(e) of the Missouri Act provides that the circulation in Missouri
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the necessity that prospective buyers enclose payment with their orders,
and then followed the procedure of the Fund in Kreis, then adoption
of the second interpretation of subsection (d) would enable the sellers
to avoid the registration requirements of the Missouri Act. It is
unlikely that the Missouri General Assembly intended for such trans-
actions, not otherwise exempt and not involving exempt securities, to
escape the comprehensive registration requirements of the Act.152
Fifthly, several extrinsic aids to construction offer support for the
first interpretation of section 409.415(d). As discussed above, that
interpretation would bring within the scope of the Act all contracts for
the sale of securities that are completed by the seller's sending an ac-
ceptance to the buyer in Missouri or that, in the case of unilateral con-
tracts, are made binding by the seller's directing to the Missouri buyer,
within a reasonable time, notification of the seller's prior acceptance.
This construction of subsection (d) would thus minimize, for the pur-
pose of determining the scope of the Act, the importance of the
distinction between bilateral and unilateral contraots. A similar policy
minimi~zing the bilateral-unilateral distinction and emphasizing com-
munication between the parties, for the purpose of establishing the
enforceability of any contraot for the sale of securities, is found in the
statute of frauds section of the article on investment securities in the
Missouri Uniform Commercial Code. 1 3
Although the particular contract in Kreis would have been enforce-
able against the Fund under section 400.8-319(b) of the Missouri Code
of such publications does not constitute the making of an offer to sell or to buy in Mis-
souri. See text accompanying notes 82-84 supra.
152. Cf. text accompanying notes 89 supra, 156 infra.
153. Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.8-319 (1969) provides:
A contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by way of action or
defense unless
(a) there is some writing signed by the party against whom enforcement
is sought or by his authorized agent or broker sufficient to indicate that a
contract has been made for sale of a stated quantity of described securities
at a defined or stated price; or
(b) delivery of the security has been accepted or payment has been
made but the contract is enforceable under this provision only to the extent
of such delivery or payment; or
(c) within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the sale or
purchase and sufficient against the sender under paragraph (a) has been re-
ceived by the party against whom enforcement is sought and he has failed
to send written objection to its contents within ten days after its receipt; or
(d) the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his plead-
ing, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract was made for sale of
a stated quantity of described securities at a defined or stated price.
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after the Fund deposited Kreis' check, section 400.8-319(a) states the
otherwise general requirement that in order for such a contract to be
enforceable, there must be a writing signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought and indicating "that a contract has been made for
sale of a stated quantity of described securities at a defined or stated
price . . . ." Section 400.8-319(c) provides in effect that the pre-
requisite for a broker's enforcement of such a contract is satisfied if,
within a reasonable time, the buyer has received a letter of confirmation
sufficient against the broker, and the buyer has failed to send written
objection to its contents within ten days after its receipt. The general
policy of the section is clearly that a contract for the sale of securities is
unenforceable against a broker who has not received payment unless
the broker has sent the buyer the required writing. In view of this
requirement, it is certainly not unreasonable for section 409.415(d) to
look to the sending and receipt of an acceptance, or notification
thereof, in order to determine whether an offer to buy is "accepted
in Missouri."
The first suggested construction of section 409.415(d) receives
additional support from the official comments and draftsmen's com-
mentary to the Uniform Act. Comment 8 to section 414 of the Uniform
Act states:
If the selling dealer in State S merely sends a confirmation or delivers
the security into State B, or the buyer in State B sends a check in pay-
ment from within State B, the statute of State B does not apply except
when under § 414(d) the confirmation or delivery constitutes the seller's
acceptance of the buyer's offer to buy.1 4
As the district judge in Kreis astutely observed, "subsection (d) does
not define 'acceptance' and the official commentary is of little help in
referring the reader back to subsection (d) to determine whether
under that section the confirmation constituted the seller's 'accept-
ance.' ,,155 It is likely, however, that the final clause of Comment 8
refers to the seller's "acceptance in State B" (defined in subsection
(d)), and not to the seller's common law acceptance of the offer to
buy.
This interpretation of Comment 8 receives support from Draftsmen's
Commentary 7 to section 414 of the Uniform Act. Draftsmenes Com-
mentary 7 states:
154. UNIFORM SEcuITrris Acr §§ 414(a)-(f), Comment 8 (emphasis added).
155. 335 F. Supp. at 1305.
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Suppose a prospective buyer in State B writes or telephones the dealer
in State S who inserted [an] advertisement [in a national newspaper or
magazine]. The dealer, if he is legitimate and careful, will either comply
with the law of State B or reply that he has not done so. If the buyer
comes to State S and a sale is made there, only the law of State S ap-
plies. On the other hand, if the seller in State S accepts the buyer's
offer to buy by sending a letter or delivering the security or a confir-
mation in State B without any previous acceptance in State S, then the
law of State B applies -to the transaction. In other words, unless the
buyer goes to State S an actual sale to him resulting from the foreign
advertisement or program makes the statute of State B apply; and at
the same time there is no possibility that the seller will be entrapped,
because he should not accept an offer originating from State B without
checking -to see whether he must comply and has complied with the
statute of State B.156
Some difficulty in interpreting this commentary is caused by the use
of the term "acceptance." It is inconceivable, however, that when Pro-
fessor Loss wrote this commentary, he had not contemplated the
possibility of common law unilateral contracts for the sale of securities.
The only remaining way of reconciling the italicized portions of the
commentary (since an offer contemplating acceptance by performance
of an act could be accepted in State S, in the common law sense, with-
out the buyer physically going to State S) is to assume that Loss was
here speaking of "acceptance in State S" in the way defined by subsec-
tion (d)-namely, as communication of acceptance. Official Com-
ment 8 and Draftsmen's Commentary 7 to section 414 of -the Uniform
Act thus indicate, though not so clearly as intimated by the court in
Kreis, 57 that the framers of the Act intended that section 414(d)
receive the construction placed upon it by the court. 1 8
156. Loss & CowETr 404-05 (emphasis added).
157. 473 F.2d at 1313.
158. The weight to be given to official comments to uniform laws, in dealing with
problems in construction of those faws, is a much disputed matter. See, e.g., Merrill,
Uniformly Correct Construction of Uniform Laws, 49 A.B.A.J. 545 (1963); Skilton,
Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1966 Wis. L.
REv. 597, 597-606. Whatever weight is to be given to the official comments, seemingly
less weight should be attached to the draftsmen's commentary, available only in a trea-
tise by the authors of the uniform law. (Neither court in Kreis even referred to Drafts-
men's Commentary 7, although it was clearer and more nearly in point with the issue
in Kreis than was Comment 8, -which both courts cited.) Since the Missouri Supreme
Court has not decided what importance should attach to such official comments or
draftsmen's commentary, the wisest course appears to be that followed by the two courts
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1974/iss3/2
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Even if the second suggested construction of section 409.415(d) is
accepted as correct, the result in Kreis may still be defensible.
Because section 409.415 defines the scope of the Act in terms of "offer"
and "acceptance," and because the second construction of subsection
(d) would in effect give "acceptance" a common law meaning, 159 it
can be argued that the scope-of-act provisions in section 409.415 were
intended to apply only to bilateral contracts. In that case, the
applicability of the Act to unilateral contracts would be governed by
language found elsewhere in the Act-for example, the prohibition in
section 409.301 of the offer or sale of an unregistered security "in this
state."160 Because of the broad definition of "sale" in section 409.401
(j)(1),161 the Fund's disposition of its shares to Kreis could be held
to be a sale "in this state. ' '" 2
IV. CONCLUSION
Kreis is the only reported case that has required construction of a
scope-of-act provision modeled on section 414 of the Uniform Securities
Aot.'" Therefore, little basis exists for predicting exactly what prob-
in Kreis-viz., to refer to the official comments only for support of a construction ar-
rived at by use of intrinsic aids to construction.
159. See text accompanying note 138 supra.
160. See note 19 supra.
161. See note 5 supra.
162. In a case decided shortly after Kreis, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit gave a similarly expansive construction of the word "sale" in the Illinois Securities
Act. Green v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 479 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1973). The defini-
tion of "sale" in the Illinois Act, however, is even broader than the corresponding defini-
tion in the Missouri Act. See note 5 supra.
It is difficult to predict what choice-of-law rule the Missouri courts would use to de-
cide if an offer or sale was made "in this state." See notes 8 & 10 supra and accompany-
ing text. To some extent, the uncertainty of results under the choice-of-law rules is
lessened by broad readings of "offer" and "sale." But the primary purpose of § 414
of the Uniform Securities Act was elimination of the complexity and unpredictability
inherent in the application of traditional choice-of-law rules to interstate securities
transactions. See notes 10-12 supra and accompanying text. For this reason, it is un-
likely that the draftsmen of the Uniform Act intended § 414 to apply only to bilateral
contracts.
163. The only post-Kreis case in which a scope-of-act provision identical to UNI-
FoRm ScuRrr Acr § 414 has even been mentioned is In re Information Resources
Corp., 126 NJ. Super. 42, 312 A.2d 671 (App. Div. 1973). The court there held that
for the purpose of determining the availability of the New Jersey "private offering" ex-
emption, identical to UNnwolM SEcutnrs AcT § 402(b) (9), the New Jersey provisions
identical to §§ 414(a)-(d) of the Uniform Act were irrelevant where all parts of the
transactions in question took place outside New Jersey. 126 N.J. Super. at 49, 312 A.2d
at 675. See also note 15 supra and accompanying text.
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lems may arise in the construction of the section. The issues raised
in Kreis, however, do indicate that certain modifications in the
language of section 414 (section 409.415 of the Missouri Act) may avert
some constructional problems in future cases.
First, the proviso to section 409.415(c) of the Missouri Act could
be rewritten in either of two ways, depending upon -the intent of the
Missouri legislature.6 4 If the legislature did intend to restrict the pro-
tection provided Missouri residents through the conjunction of section
409.415(c)(1) and sections 409.415(a)(2) and (b)(2), then the ad-
dition of the phrase "to sell or to buy" after the first appearance of
the word "offer" in the proviso would achieve the legislative intent.
The proviso would then read as follows:
provided, however, if an offer to sell or to buy is directed to an offeree
in a state other than this state and that offer would be lawful if made
in such other state, then for the purposes of this section such offer is
not made in this state. 16 5
If, however, the legislature did not intend to limit the protection
given Missouri residents under the Act, then the proviso could be
reworded in the following way:
provided, however, that if any person directs an offer that would other-
wise violate this Act to an offeree in a state other than this state, and
that offer would be lawful if made in such other state, then for the
purposes of this section such offer is not made in this state.
This redraft would restrict the applicability of the proviso to cases in-
volving sections 409.415(a) (1) or (b) (1). The protection afforded
Missouri residents under sections 409.415(a) (2) and (b) (2) would
not be restricted because, in cases involving those sections, the Missouri
164. In this discussion, it is assumed that the Missouri legislature's primary intent
in adding the proviso to § 409.415(c) was to limit the pursuit of the policy of comity.
See notes 90-104, 106 supra and accompanying text. The wisdom of this legislative de-
cision will not be examined here.
165. The legislative intent expressed in this redraft could be defeated only if a court
construed the proviso as applicable to cases involving §§ 409.415(a) (1) or (b) (1), but
inapplicable to cases involving §§ 409.415(a)(2) or (b)(2). This construction would
seem highly unlikely for two reasons. First, it would require a court to give the same
words full effect in one set of circumstances, and no effect at all in another. Cf. text
accompanying note 112 supra. Secondly, the construction would ignore the amendment
of the proviso in response to, and apparently in disapproval of, the construction in Kreis.
Cf. 2A SuT -RLAN § 49.10.
To eliminate the possibility of conflict between different parts of § 409.415, see notes
108-21 supra and accompanying text, the legislature should also delete 9§ 409.415(a) (2)
and (b) (2).
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resident would not be making "an offer that would otherwise violate
this Act. .... 166
Alternatively, the legislative intent to restrict the pursuit of the policy
of comity but not to limit the protection provided Missouri residents
could be achieved by deleting the proviso to section 409.415(c) and
adding provisos to sections 409.415(a) and (b). The proviso to section
409.415(a) would read as follows:
provided, however, that section 409.101, 409.201 (a), 409.301, 409.405,
and 409.411 do not apply to a person who sells or offers to sell if the
person directs an offer to sell to an offeree in a state other than this
state, and that offer would be lawful in such other state.
A parallel proviso, mutatis mutandis, would be added to section
409.415(b).18 T
Secondly, revision of section 409.415(d) of the Missouri Act (sec-
tion 414(d) of the Uniform Act) could resolve the issue raised in Kreis
as to the proper construction of that section. Since the draftsmen of
the Uniform Act probably intended section 414 to apply to both bilateral
and unilateral contracts,' 68 the attempt to revise section 414(d) should
focus on the second part of the section.1 69 Substitution of the phrase
"acceptance or notice thereof" for the term "it" in the second half of
the section would probably eliminate the constructional problem raised
in Kreis. In its entirety, revised section 414(d) would read as follows:
For the purpose of this section, an offer to buy or to sell is accepted
in this state when acceptance (1) is communicated to the offeror in this
166. See note 91 supra.
167. This second method of effecting the legislative intent-namely, deletion of the
proviso to § 409.415(c) and addition of provisos to §§ 409.415(a) and (b)-is some-
what objectionable because it requires two provisos instead of one. Although each of
the provisos would be in closer juxtaposition to the sections ultimately restricted-§§
409.415(a)(1) and (b)(1)-than would the proviso to § 409.415(c), additional prob-
lems would arise because §§ 409.415(a)(1) and (b)(1) are each phrased in terms of
offers "made in this state" whereas the provisos to §§ (a) and (b) would not be so
phrased. For these reasons, rewording of the proviso to § 409.415(c) would probably
be the preferable way of implementing the legislative intent.
It is also true that the provisos added to §§ 409.415(a) and (b) would be separated
from the clauses they restrict by §§ 409.415(a)(2) and (b)(2). But this objection is
equally true of the proviso to § 409.415(c). See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
Given the structure of §§ 414(a), (b), and (c) of the Uniform Act, there is no way
of expressing the intent of the Missouri legislature without placing a proviso next to
a clause that the proviso does not restrict.
168. See notes 154-58 supra and accompanying text; note 162 supra.
169. See notes 133 & 136 supra and accompanying text.
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state and (2) has not previously been communicated to the offeror,
orally or in writing, outside this state; and acceptance is communicated
to the offeror in This state, whether or not either party is then present in
this state, when the offeree directs the acceptance or notice thereof to the
offeror in this state reasonably believing the offeror to be in this state,
and -the acceptance or notice thereof is received at the place to which it
is directed (or at any post office in this state in the case of a mailed ac-
ceptance or notice).
Although this redraft of section 414(d) may not resolve all foreseeable
issues in the construction of the section,17 0 it would probably resolve
those problems-like the one in Kreis-that are most likely to arise.
Since many states have already enacted the scope-of-act provisions
of the Uniform Act, including section 414(d),' 71 adoption of the revised
section 414(d) proposed above would necessarily entail some sacrifice
of the goal of uniformity.17 2  Nevertheless, the revision of section 414
(d) would probably help achieve the declared objective of the drafts-
men of the Uniform Act: a simple and explicit description of the trans-
actions to which the Act applies. 8
170. For example, a tender offeror in New York could place an advertisement in the
Wall Street Journal, inviting shareholders to send their stock certificates along with their
offers to sell to a named depository. The offeror could state in the advertisement that
the transactions will be closed when the desired number of shares have been received.
Then, after the specified number of shares have been tendered, the offeror could run
a notice to that effect in the Journal and could mail checks to the persons who have
tendered shares. It is not at all clear whether the mailing of such a check to a seller
in Missouri would constitute acceptance "in this state" under § 409.415(d) and would
thus bring the buyer within the scope of § 409.415(b) (2). It is even less clear whether
the notice in the Journal that the transactions have been closed would constitute accept-
ance "in this state." The proposed redraft of § 409.415(d) would not significantly clar-
ify the situation.
171. See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text.
172. Adoption in Missouri of one of the suggested revisions of the proviso to §
409.415(c), notes 164-67 supra and accompanying text, would not entail any such sacri-
fice of uniformity, because the Missouri legislature has already departed from the Uni-
form Act by adding the proviso.
173. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
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